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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER: THESIS OVERVIEW 
 The aim of this thesis was to explore the constructs of rumination and worry and 
investigate how they impact mental health.  Rumination and worry have similar process 
characteristics and are collectively referred to as repetitive negative thinking (RNT).  RNT is 
defined as recurring thoughts, about negative topics, that are experienced as difficult to control.  
This definition does not account for the observed variations between these processes such as 
differences in content.  Rumination has been found to focus on past negative experiences whereas 
worry focuses on future concerns.  These processes are considered to have a detrimental effect on 
mental well-being with rumination frequently associated with depression and worry with anxiety.   
Despite these negative associations, there is growing argument that rumination and worry are 
adaptive self-regulatory responses to perceived failure to achieve desired states or goals.  They 
are problem-solving attempts to resolve discrepancies between current and desired status, and 
only become problematic in certain circumstances such as when goals are unattainable.  Goal-
linking is the degree to which people link the attainment of everyday goals with more salient 
personal strivings (e.g. to be happy) and may be one circumstance in which engaging in RNT has 
unconstructive consequences.  People high on the tendency to goal-link are known as 'linkers'.  
Linkers are thought to spend more time ruminating because their goals are linked to higher-order 
personal strivings that hold more meaning, are more abstract, and tend to be more enduring.  This 
increases the degree of discrepancy they experience because they are aiming for a reference value 
that is vague (e.g. happiness can occur in many forms) and makes it difficult to disengage from 
the goal due to its perceived importance.  Being able to disengage from RNT would likely 
improve linkers mental health and well-being.  Mindfulness is an alternative cognitive process 
associated with better well-being, and people who are more mindful ruminate less.  It is proposed 
that mindful people are able to notice when they are ruminating and disengage from these 
thoughts if they are unhelpful.  Training linkers to be more mindful could potentially reduce the 
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degree to which they engage in RNT and subsequently improve their mental health and well-
being. 
 Chapter 1 presents a systematic literature review of the studies that have directly 
compared rumination and worry.  The aim of this review was to consider the evidence for 
rumination and worry being similar enough processes to be conceptualised within one 
overarching meta-process, namely RNT.  A systematic search of the literature identified 15 
studies that met specific inclusion criteria for comparing rumination and worry with one another.  
The methodological quality of the papers is assessed using a recently developed quality tool and 
the data are qualitatively analysed and presented.  The review evaluates how rumination and 
worry are conceptualised and measured distinctly, and the degree of overlap found between them.  
Results are discussed in relation to the wider literature base and clinical implications for the 
measurement of rumination and worry are conveyed. 
 Chapter 2 is an empirical paper investigating the relationships between the key constructs 
relevant to this thesis in a non-clinical sample.  The aim was to address some of the gaps in the 
literature and establish the impact of goal-linking and cognitive processes on mental well-being.  
Linkers have been found to ruminate more than non-linkers but, to the best of the author's 
knowledge, this relationship has not been investigated in relation to worry or RNT.  A student 
sample completed an online survey of the constructs of interest.  The differences between linkers 
and non-linkers with regards RNT, rumination, worry, and mindfulness, are examined using 
theoretically derived hypotheses.  The mediating effect of RNT on goal-linking and depressive 
and anxious symptoms was assessed, in addition to, the mediating effect of mindfulness on goal-
linking and well-being.  The findings are discussed in the context of previous research, relevant 
literature and recommendations for future research.  The chapter concludes with clinical 
implications of the study. 
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CHAPTER 1: SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1 Abstract
1 
Rumination and worry have developed distinct conceptualisations but are considered to share 
common process characteristics and only differ on content.  The argument for considering 
them collectively within a single process of repetitive negative thinking (RNT) remains 
inconclusive.  This review aims to consider the evidence of whether rumination and worry 
are more similar or distinct, and conclude whether they can be conceptualised within a 
unitary construct.  A systematic review of the literature resulted in 15 studies that directly 
compared the two constructs.  Findings indicated that rumination and worry are consistently 
related but maintain a degree of distinctness.  It is concluded that this distinction is due to 
methodological variations in measurement and when these confounds are removed, they 
appear more similar.  Rumination and worry can plausibly be conceptualised and measured 
within a unitary construct of repetitive negative thinking but further research is warranted to 
strengthen this conclusion. 
Keywords: Rumination, worry, repetitive negative thinking, measurement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Footnote 
 1
Systematic review paper to be submitted to Cognitive Therapy and Research. 
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Ruminating and Worrying, or Repetitive Negative Thinking?: A Systematic Review of 
Whether Rumination and Worry are Similar or Distinct Processes 
1.2 Introduction 
 Rumination is a multifaceted construct with multiple ways of defining it depending on 
the context of the theoretical viewpoint through which it is being observed (for a review see 
Smith & Alloy, 2009).  According to Smith and Alloy (2009) the most prolific theory of 
rumination is Nolen-Hoeksema's (1991) response styles theory (RST).  RST describes 
depressive rumination as a response to a negative emotional state which involves focusing 
one's attention on depressive symptoms and the implications of these symptoms (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991).  Goal progress theory (Martin, Tesser, & McIntosh, 1993) defines 
rumination more broadly as a mental activity, that revolves around a common instrumental 
theme, which occurs in response to threats regarding progression towards a desired goal or 
state (Martin & Tesser, 1996).  In conclusion of their review, Smith and Alloy suggest that 
rumination should be characterised as: "a stable, negative, broadly construed way of 
responding to discrepancies between current status and target status" (Smith & Alloy, 2009, 
p.126).  They propose that rumination is triggered by identifying a discrepancy between one's 
current and desired state, and the negative affect that typically accompanies perceiving such a 
discrepancy (Carver & Scheier, 1990).  Smith and Alloy argue that rumination is an attempt 
to regulate emotions, driven by positive metacognitive beliefs about its effectiveness in 
resolving perceived discrepancies between actual and desired status, but that ruminative 
thinking is a form of avoidance that interrupts adaptive processing of negative emotions. 
 The definition of worry appears much less varied than rumination; it is most 
commonly defined as: "a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively 
uncontrollable" (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & Depree, 1983, p.10).  Borkovec et al. 
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suggest worry is a form of mental problem-solving when the outcome of something remains 
uncertain, but could potentially be negative; they note how closely worry relates to fear.  It 
was subsequently found that worrying predominantly involves verbal thought, rather than 
imagery (Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998).  Borkovec's avoidance theory of worry (Borkovec, 
1994; Borkovec et al., 1998) proposes that worry is a cognitive activity aimed at avoiding 
perceived threat.  It denotes the focus on verbal activity as a means of allowing individuals to 
turn attention away from internally generated emotion-evoking imagery, which reduces the 
occurrence of somatic anxiety and hence worrying becomes negatively reinforced.  
Additionally, the continued 'non-occurrence' of predicted negative events reinforces the belief 
that worry is an effective process for avoiding threats (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004).  
This theory highlights how worry, like other avoidant responses, interferes with adaptive 
emotional processing and hence prevents extinction of the fear.  In other words, the person 
does not experience the emotion associated with the feared event and therefore is still afraid 
of it occurring.  This is still the case if the person actually experiences the feared event but 
engages in verbal activity throughout to draw attention away from the emotional experience 
(Borkovec et al., 2004). 
 Rumination and worry have been suggested to converge on three common 
characteristics: repetitive in nature, usually focus on negative content although may differ in 
the specificities of content, and are both perceived as uncontrollable (Ehring & Watkins, 
2008).  In light of these commonalities, rumination and worry, along with other cognitive 
activities defined as having similar qualities (e.g. post-event processing, obsessive cognition), 
are increasingly being conceptualised within one overarching meta-process commonly 
referred to as repetitive negative thinking (RNT).  RNT has been defined according to the 
shared characteristics of the underlying processes it is intended to encompass: thinking 
repetitively about negative topics which is experienced as difficult to control (Watkins, 
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2008).  In his review of constructive and unconstructive repetitive thought (RT), Watkins 
(2008) suggests that rumination and worry are similar processes that only differ in terms of 
content, specifically their temporal orientation with rumination focusing on past negative 
events while worry focuses on future concerns.  Segerstrom and colleagues (2003) attempted 
to test the conceptualisation of RT as a unitary process by considering a variety of defined 
repetitive cognitive constructs (including rumination and worry) collectively.  They found 
that RT, including forms considered to be adaptive (e.g. reflection), appeared to vary along at 
least two dimensions: positive versus negative valence of thoughts, and a searching or a 
solving purpose for engaging in the process.  Again these differences reflect the content of 
RT, and additionally the purpose of RT, but do not imply whether rumination and worry 
differ in terms of process. 
 Debate has grown over whether previously considered distinct types of RT (e.g. 
rumination, worry, post-event processing, obsessive cognition) can validly be conceptualised 
within one overarching meta-process that is transdiagnostic (i.e. spans multiple diagnoses of 
mental health difficulties; for a review see Ehring & Watkins, 2008; and, Harvey, Watkins, 
Mansell, & Shafran, 2004).  Historically rumination has predominantly been considered in 
relation to depression and worry to anxiety, however, there is significant evidence that both 
rumination and worry are present across multiple disorders and can be viewed as 
transdiagnostic processes (McEvoy, Watson, Watkins, & Nathan, 2013; Mahoney, McEvoy, 
& Moulds, 2012; McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 2010; Ruscio et al., 2011).  This has 
implications for the measurement of rumination and worry in clinical settings as currently 
they are typically measured separately and in relation to specific mental health diagnoses 
whereas perhaps a transdiagnostic measure may be more valid.  Ehring and Watkins (2008) 
in their review of RNT as a transdiagnostic phenomenon suggest that rumination and worry 
have more similarities than differences but that there is still limited evidence to conclude 
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whether they are part of one single process.  They argue that the amount of similarity 
between rumination and worry allows for reasonable acceptance of the parsimonious 
hypothesis that they share an analogous process and only differ in terms of content, but it is 
questionable if there is sufficient evidence to draw this conclusion.  One of the difficulties in 
answering this question is the limited validity in comparing rumination and worry due to 
methodological variation in their measurement.  Rumination is commonly measured by the 
Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) of the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and worry by the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; 
Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990).  Both of these self-report measures were 
constructed from separate theoretical backgrounds and adopt different formats such as use of 
confounding or disorder-specific wording; the PSWQ includes some form of the term 'worry' 
in every item and the RRS has been shown to have significant overlap with items from the 
Beck Depression Inventory that measure depressive symptoms (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003).  A number of studies have tried to  overcome this measurement confound 
by removing references to specific symptoms or processes (e.g. replacing the word 'worry' 
with a more generic reference to 'thoughts or images'; Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 
2005; McEvoy et al., 2010).  This is an important step in making a valid comparison between 
them but more examination is needed.  While efforts have already been made to develop a 
unified measure of RNT (e.g. the Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire; Ehring et al., 2011), 
the evidence to support rumination and worry as comparable processes, when measured 
independently, still remains inconclusive.  The aim of this systematic review is to consider 
the available evidence for whether rumination and worry, two of the most commonly 
investigated repetitive cognitions, are similar enough to be conceptualised within one 
overarching meta-process, namely RNT. 
1.2.1 Aims 
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 To review all studies that compare rumination and worry directly with each other in 
order to examine the following: (a) how rumination and worry are conceptualised; (b) how 
rumination and worry are measured; (c) when compared, the degree of similarity or 
difference between these constructs; and (d) whether they can reasonably be conceptualised 
as part of a unitary process. 
1.3 Method 
1.3.1 Eligibility Criteria 
 Studies were included if they: (i) were published in English, in peer-reviewed 
journals; (ii) were conducted within any population or setting; (iii) used any conceptualisation 
of rumination or worry (e.g. post-event rumination); (iv) measured both rumination and 
worry as separate constructs (i.e. using distinct measures for each); (v) compared rumination 
and worry directly to one another. 
 Studies were excluded on the following basis: (i) a review or discussion paper rather 
than an empirical study; (ii) use of animal rather than human participants; (iii) rumination and 
worry were measured as a collective process (i.e. measured RNT/perseverative 
thinking/negative self-referential processing/negative emotionality/cognitive attentional 
syndrome); (iv) rumination and/or worry were measured qualitatively using subjective self-
report; and (v) compared rumination and worry in relation to other third variables rather than 
directly to each other. 
1.3.2 Information Sources 
 The following four major electronic databases were searched: Scopus; PsycINFO; 
Web of Knowledge; and MEDLINE.  Bibliographies of previous reviews and retrieved 
articles were also examined. 
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1.3.3 Search Strategy 
   The search intended to find studies that examined both rumination and worry so key 
search terms included 'rumination' and 'worry' within the same search.  Wildcards were used 
to capture alternate terms; that is, ruminat* to include terms such as rumination, ruminating, 
ruminate, ruminator, ruminative, and worr* to include terms such as worry, worried, worrier, 
worrying.  Additionally, alternative terms used to describe both rumination and worry as a 
collective process were included: any combination of 'repetitive'/ 'perseverative'/ 'recurrent' 
'thinking'/ 'thought'/'cognition'; 'repetitive negative thinking'; 'negative' 'self-referential 
processing'; 'negative emotionality'; or 'cognitive attentional syndrome'.  The initial search of 
the databases for 'rumination' or alternative terms, and 'worry' or alternative terms, returned 
3,469 papers. 
1.3.4 Study Selection 
 Duplicate papers were removed and study titles were screened for relevance, 
removing any that did not include key search terms in the title (see Figure 1).  This left a total 
of 326 papers that were then screened for content relevance by applying inclusion and 
exclusion criteria.  After these criteria were applied, 15 studies were included in the review 
(see Table 1 for details of included studies).  A second researcher screened a subset (50%) of 
the 326 papers and substantial inter-rater reliability (κ = .80) was found between the papers 
selected from the screening and the papers included in the review. 
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Figure 1: Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) 
flow-diagram of number of studies included/excluded through different phases of the 
systematic review. 
1.3.5 Data Analysis 
 Data extraction.  A protocol was specifically developed in relation to the review 
aims to extract and record data from each paper (see Table 1).  Due to the diverse range of 
methodologies and outcome measures, statistical methods of synthesising the data were not 
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appropriate.  Extracted data were collated and reported qualitatively for this review, 
producing a comprehensive narrative account of the findings. 
 Quality appraisal.  The methodological quality of the included studies was assessed 
using the Quality Assessment Tool for Studies with Diverse Designs (QATSDD; Sirriyeh, 
Lawton, Gardner, & Armitage, 2012).  The QATSDD consists of 16 criteria for assessing the 
quality of a research paper.  Twelve criteria apply to all studies, two criteria apply 
specifically to quantitative studies and two criteria apply specifically to qualitative studies.  
This means that 14/16 criteria can be applied to either type of study (12 general criteria plus 
two specific to that particular methodology) and all criteria can be used with mixed-method 
designs.  Criteria are scored on a scale from 0 to 3 and a total score is used to compare the 
quality of papers being reviewed, even if they use diverse research designs. 
 The QATSDD was utilised in this review because the studies being reviewed adopted 
a variety of methodological designs.  The QATSDD has preliminarily shown good content 
validity, substantial inter-rater reliability (κ = 71.5%), and good to substantial test-retest 
reliability (κ = 51.7-100%; Sirriyeh et al., 2012).  While studies were not excluded based on 
their quality rating, this information was considered when extracting the data in relation to 
the reliability and validity of each of the studies' findings and conclusions. 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Included Study Characteristics 
The characteristics of all 15 studies included in the review are detailed in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Summary of study characteristics with key findings and QATSDD quality assessment score 
Authors Sample Measure(s) α in sample Data analytic 
method 
Main finding QATSDD 
Total score 
Boschloo, Vogelzangs, 
van den Brink, Smit, 
Beekman, & Penninx 
(2012) 
Clinical & non-clinical 
2248 adults with & 
without a dx of depressive 
&/or anxiety disorders 
LEIDS-R: Rumination 
reactivity subscale  
PSWQ: Worry Engagement 
subscale 
.93                            
 
.96 
Factor 
analysis; 
correlation 
2-factor model: Negative emotionality 
(inc. rumination & worry) & impulsivity 
27 
Carney, Harris, Moss, & 
Edinger (2010) 
Clinical & non-clinical 
210 adults with sleep 
problems 
RSQ: SYM subscale 
PSWQ-PW 
.86 
.84 
Factor 
analysis; 
correlation 
3-factor model: Worry, rumination, & 
absence of worry 
33 
Ciesla, Dickson, 
Anderson, & Neal 
(2011) 
Non-clinical 
447 students 
RRS 
ARS 
CoR 
PSWQ 
.90 
.95 
.96 
.93 
Factor 
analysis; 
generalizabili
ty analysis; 
correlation 
4-factor model: Depressive ruminaton, 
angry-rumination, worry, & co-
rumination 
28 
D'Hudson & Saling 
(2010) 
Non-clinical 
138 older adults 
aRRS: Rumination subscale 
aRRS: Worry subscale 
NR 
NR 
Factor 
analysis 
3-factor model: Brooding, reflection, & 
worry 
31 
Fresco, Frankel, 
Mennin, Turk, & 
Heimberg (2002) 
Non-clinical 
784 students 
RRS 
PSWQ 
.90 
.90 
Factor 
analysis; 
correlation 
4-factor model: Worry engagement, 
dwelling on the negative, active cognitive 
appraisal, & absence of worry 
30 
Goring & Papageorgiou 
(2008) 
Non-clinical 
216 people from 
depression charities 
RRS 
PSWQ 
NR 
NR 
Factor 
analysis; 
correlation 
4-factor model: Tendency to worry, 
tendency to analyse feelings/self, 
dwelling on negative feelings, & absence 
of worry 
30 
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Authors Sample Measure(s) α in sample Data analytic 
method 
Main finding QATSDD 
Total score 
McEvoy & Brans 
(2013) 
Clinical 
450 patients with 
diagnosis of mood &/or 
anxiety disorder 
RRS (items confounded by 
symptoms removed) 
PSWQ 
NR 
            NR 
 
Factor 
analysis 
4-factor nested model: Reflection, 
Brooding, Worry, & RNT 
34 
McEvoy, Mahoney, & 
Moulds (2010) 
Non-clinical 
284 students 
RRS 
PSWQ 
(wording adjusted & items 
removed to reduce symptom 
confounds) 
NR 
NR 
Factor 
analysis; 
correlation 
2-factor model: RNT & absence of RNT 27 
Muris, Roelofs, 
Meesters, & Boomsma 
(2004) 
Non-clinical 
337 adolescents 
CRSS 
PSWQ-C 
.71 - .95 
.71 - .95 
Factor 
analysis; 
correlation 
2-factor model: Rumination & worry 31 
Rewston, Clarke, 
Moniz-Cook, & 
Waddington (2007) 
Clinical & non-clinical 
92 older adults 
aRRS: Rumination subscale 
aRRS: Worry subscale 
NR 
NR 
Factor 
analysis; 
correlation 
3-factor model: Brooding, reflection, & 
worry 
33 
Rood, Roelofs, Bogels, 
& Alloy (2010) 
Non-clinical 
779-805 children 
CRSS 
SRRS-C 
PSWQ-C 
NR 
NR 
NR 
Factor 
analysis 
3-factor model: Worry, emotion-focused, 
& stress-reactive rumination 
34 
Segerstrom, Stanton, 
Alden, & Shortridge 
(2003) - Study 1 
Non-clinical 
978 students 
RRS 
RRQ 
Rumination Scale 
PSWQ 
.91 
.90 - .91 
.70 
.94 
Factor 
analysis; 
correlation; 
multi-
dimensional 
scaling 
Rumination & worry were more negative 
on a thought valence dimension; Worry 
was more problem-solving than 
rumination on a searching vs. solving 
dimension 
19 
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Authors Sample Measure(s) α in sample Data analytic 
method 
Main finding QATSDD 
Total score 
Siegle, Moore, & Thase 
(2004) 
Non-clinical 
349 students 
RRS 
RNE 
MRQ 
ROS 
SMRI 
RRQ 
PSWQ 
.89 
.80 
.84 - .94 
.90 
.88 
.88 - .89 
.94 
Factor 
analysis; 
correlation 
4-factor model: Negatively valenced trait 
rumination (inc. worry), rumination on a 
past negative event, neutral valenced 
reflection/reconsideration of negative 
event, & responses not clearly 
representing rumination 
35 
van Rijsoort, 
Emmelkamp, & 
Vervaeke (2001) 
Non-clinical 
305 adults 
Rumination subscale of the PI-
R 
PSWQ 
NR 
            NR 
Factor 
analysis; 
correlation 
Items from rumination and worry scales 
loaded on separate factors 
26 
Watkins, Moulds, & 
Mackintosh (2005) 
Non-clinical 
175 female students 
RRS 
WDQ 
(wording adjusted & items 
removed/added to reduce 
symptom confounds) 
NR 
NR 
 
Paired 
samples t-
tests 
Rumination & worry differed 
significantly on 7/53 variables 
24 
Note. QATSDD = Quality Assessment Tool for Studies with Diverse Designs, LEIDS-R = Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity Revised scale; PSWQ = Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire; RSQ = Response Style Questionnaire, SYM = Symptom focused, PSWQ-PW = PSWQ-Past Week, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, ARS = Angry Rumination 
Scale, CoR = Co-Rumination Questionnaire, NR = Not reported, aRRS = Adapted RRS, CRSS = Children's RRS, PSWQ-C = Children's PSWQ, SRRS-C = Children's Stress Reactive 
Rumination Scale, RRQ = Rumination/Reflection Questionnaire, RNE = Rumination on a Negative Event, MRQ = Multidimensional Rumination Questionnaire, ROS = Rumination 
on Sadness Questionnaire, SMRI = Scott-McIntosh Rumination Index, PI-R = Padua Inventory Revised version, WDQ = Worry Domains Questionnaire.
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1.4.2 Methodological Quality 
 All studies were rated on the 14 criteria from the QATSDD that are applicable to 
quantitative studies, as no qualitative studies were included in the review; this gave a total 
score range from 0-42 (for total scores see Table 1).  The average total quality score for all 15 
studies was 29.53 (SD = 4.29) ranging from the highest score of 35/42 (Siegle et al., 2004) to 
the lowest score of 19/42 (Segerstrom et al., 2003, Study 1). 
 Most studies demonstrated a good fit between the stated research question and the 
method of data collection and analysis used.  One possible reason for this good fit is that the 
majority of studies were investigating how rumination and worry are measured.  They often 
specified particular questionnaires they intended to examine or else were developing new 
measures that were adapted from existing ones.  This resulted in studies either using the 
specified measures, the newly developed measure, or commonly used questionnaire measures 
of the construct of interest (either rumination or worry) and then using factor analysis on the 
response data.  Both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis have been identified as 
appropriate means to assess the construct validity of a measure (Lu, 2006); that is, factor 
analysis is a good test of whether the measure contains the hypothesised constructs that 
reflect the concept under investigation.  Only four of the 15 studies (Goring & Papageorgiou, 
2008; McEvoy & Brans, 2013; Segerstrom et al., 2003; Rood et al., 2010) considered the 
sample size required for the method of analysis being used.  Reporting on the characteristics 
of the targeted sample and the representativeness of the collected sample was mixed with 
three studies (Boschloo et al., 2012; Carney et al., 2010; McEvoy & Brans, 2013) awarded 
the top rating for this criteria (3/3), three studies (McEvoy et al., 2010; van Rijsoort et al., 
2001; Segerstrom et al., 2003) awarded the lowest rating for this criteria (0/3), and the 
remainder scoring in between (either 1/3 or 2/3).  The studies that did not specify their target 
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sample may have failed to do so because they were aiming for a sample that represented the 
general population and possibly assumed that generality was difficult or not necessary to 
clarify for the reader. 
 There was a broad degree of variation in studies reporting the reliability and validity 
of the measures used, either previously reported psychometric properties or as found in the 
current study sample (see Table 1 for reported Cronbach Alpha of each measure).  Of those 
that were reported, most measures demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (Alpha 
coefficients) with the exception of the 'worry' subscale of the Adapted RRS (aRRS; α = .55); 
this was a newly constructed measure and hence still in developmental stages.  Two studies 
(McEvoy & Brans, 2013; Watkins et al., 2005) did not report any reliability findings either 
from previous studies or from the current sample.  Both of these studies adapted the RRS in 
different ways for the purposes of the research being carried out (they adjusted the wording 
and removed and/or added items).  Additionally, Watkins et al. (2005) adapted the WDQ 
(adjusted the wording and removed one item).  For all three of these adapted scales, previous 
reliability findings were not available as the measures had been uniquely adjusted for the 
study being carried out, however, they did not report any reliability analysis within their 
sample.  Failing to assess and report the reliability of a newly developed measure limits the 
conclusions that can be drawn. 
 None of the 15 studies reported service user/carer-involvement in the design of the 
study, and only one reported gaining participant feedback (Siegle et al., 2004).  This study 
corroborated their hypotheses about the impact of the wording of questionnaire measures 
through informal feedback from participants after completing measures.  Service user/carer-
involvement, as it has been phrased, is increasingly recognised as improving the quality and 
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applicability of research (Hanley, 2005), but this progress was not evident in the studies 
included in this review. 
1.4.3 Conceptualisation of Constructs 
 Conceptualisation of rumination.  Eleven of the 15 studies conceptualised 
rumination in terms of Nolen-Hoeksema's (1991) RST of depressive rumination.  The 
predominance of this conceptualisation is reflected in the majority of studies using the RSQ 
(Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) to measure rumination.  One study considered two 
distinct aspects of rumination; Segerstrom et al. (2003) considered both depressive 
rumination and rumination as conceptualised in goal progress theory (Martin, Tesser, & 
McIntosh, 1993).  Van Rijsoort et al. (2001) specifically focused on obsessive compulsive 
disorder symptoms considering rumination as one such symptom in the form of obsessive 
cognition.  Boschloo et al. (2013) considered rumination as one aspect of 'negative 
emotionality' which was described as a heterogeneous construct reflecting a trait tendency to 
experience negative emotional states.  This study used the Leiden Index of Depression 
Sensitivity Revised scale (LEIDS-R; Van der Does & Williams, 2003).  This scale considers 
rumination to be a form of cognitive reactivity in response to stressful situations which brings 
about the processes linked with onset, relapse, and recurrence of depression (Beck, 1967).  
This perspective is firmly rooted within a diathesis-stress perspective; it proposes that some 
individuals have a cognitive vulnerability to react more negatively in times of difficulty and 
this leaves them susceptible to developing depression (Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005).  Siegle 
et al. (2004) specifically addressed the multifaceted nature of how rumination is 
conceptualised and measured.  They used multiple measures of rumination-like constructs in 
an attempt to establish whether rumination is a general construct.  They assessed whether the 
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variance on measurement tools is due to individual differences or different questionnaires 
measuring different constructs (i.e. there are multiple distinct rumination-like constructs). 
 Conceptualisation of worry.  Ten of the studies make reference to Borkovec's 
definition of worry (Borkovec et al., 1983) encapsulating the perspective that worry is an 
avoidant coping strategy intended to solve problems (Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998).  
Ciesla et al. (2011) refers to Watkins' (2008) definition of worry, however, this definition is 
comparable with that of Borkovec.  In addition to Borkovec's definition: Segerstrom et al. 
(2003) acknowledge the association found with intolerance of uncertainty; Rewston et al. 
(2007) note there are pathological and non-pathological forms with the former arising when 
worry is perceived as uncontrollable and excessive; and, Goring and Papageorgiou (2008) 
propose multiple theoretical approaches to worry (including considering it as a form of 
avoidance, a means of problem-solving, a coping activity, and worry's link to intolerance of 
uncertainty). 
 The remaining five studies describe worry as a cognitive process that is comparable to 
some other form of cognitive process, namely rumination and obsessive cognitions.  Four 
studies (Boschloo et al., 2013; Carney et al., 2010; Watkins et al., 2005; Siegle et al., 2004) 
consider worry as a process that is comparable to rumination.  Siegle et al. (2004) considered 
worry as a subtype of rumination while Carney et al. (2010) noted how in the insomnia 
literature, worry and rumination are often grouped within the same process (termed 
'ruminative worry').  Boschloo et al. (2013) consider worry as another aspect of 'negative 
emotionality' (as described above) and therefore a construct comparable with rumination.  
Watkins et al. (2005) note the overlap between depressive and anxious symptoms which are 
highly associated with rumination and worry respectively.  They conclude that the frequent 
co-occurrence of both depression and anxiety suggests common aspects of both rumination 
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and worry, whilst acknowledging the extent to which rumination and worry are considered 
common or distinct, remains unresolved in the literature.  Van Rijsoort et al. (2001) regard 
worry as a cognitive process comparable with, but distinct from, obsessive cognitions. 
1.4.4 Measurement 
 Measuring rumination.  Of the 15 studies, the most commonly used measure of 
rumination was the RRS of the RSQ (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; see Table 2), 
utilised in some form in 13 studies.  Five studies used the original version of the RRS (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), two used a version for children (CRRS; Ziegert & Kistner, 
2002), one study used a previously adapted version, while the other five adapted their own 
version. 
 Adapting the RRS.  Watkins et al. (2005) adapted the wording format of the RRS to 
allow for consistency within the battery of measures being administered.  This was so the 
cognitive processes being investigated (i.e. rumination, worry, and cognitive intrusions) could 
subsequently be compared.  They adjusted RRS items so they all started with the phrase 
"Thoughts and images" and applied this format to every other measure being administered.  
They excluded any item from the RRS that did not represent an intrusive thought, e.g. "Go 
away by yourself and think about why you feel this way", and they added items previously 
found by Watkins and Baracaia (2001) to represent typical ruminative thoughts, e.g. 
"Thoughts and images about why am I such a failure". 
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Table 2  
Summary of studies using the RRS, including various versions, and other scales used to measure 
rumination 
Measure No. of studies (%) Studies 
 Used RRS = 13 (86.6%)  
Original version (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
5 (33.3%) Ciesla et al. (2011); Fresco et al. (2002); 
Goring & Papageorgiou (2008); Segerstrom 
et al. (2003); Siegle et al. (2004). 
Adapted for current study 
(wording adjusted and items 
removed/added) 
5 (33.3%) Carney et al. (2010); McEvoy & Brans 
(2013); McEvoy et al. (2010); Rewston et al. 
(2007); Watkins et al. (2005). 
Previously adapted version 
(aRRS) 
1 (6.7%) Hudson & Saling (2010). 
Children's version (CRRS) 2 (13.3%) Muris et al. (2004); Rood et al. (2010). 
 Used other measure = 2 (13.4%)  
Rumination subscale of the PI-R 
(van Oppen et al., 1995) 
1 (6.7%) van Rijsoort et al. (2001). 
Rumination reactivity' subscale of 
the LEIDS-R 
1 (6.7%) Boschloo et al. (2012). 
Note. RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, aRRS = Adapted RRS, CRRS = Children's RRS, PI-R = 
Padua Inventory revised version, LEIDS-R = Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity Revised scale. 
 Two studies adjusted the wording and the items included/excluded, to account for 
confounds between rumination and symptoms of depression (McEvoy & Brans, 2013; 
McEvoy et al., 2010).  McEvoy and Brans (2013) used similar exclusion criteria as Treynor 
et al. (2003), despite employing a different version of the RRS (the original version by 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), in order to remove items from the scale related to 
depression symptoms.  McEvoy and Brans (2013) additionally removed items containing the 
word 'depression' so as not to artificially inflate the relationship between the RRS and 
measures of depression; and so people without a history of depression could potentially 
endorse all items.  McEvoy et al. (2010) adjusted the wording of the RRS using the same 
21 
 
strategy as Watkins et al. (2005) as described above.  They also altered the instructions so 
that individuals answered items in relation to a specific situation.  Similar to McEvoy and 
Brans (2013) and consistent with Treynor et al.'s (2003) approach, McEvoy et al. (2010) 
removed items that likely measured depressive symptoms.  They also removed items that 
indexed physical symptoms because they were not cognitive in nature and the transdiagnostic 
applicability of physical symptoms was indeterminable.  They included the adapted items 
from the RRS, with adapted items from a measure of worry and a measure of post-event 
processing, to form a new scale called the Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire (RTQ). 
 Rewston et al. (2007) adapted a 10-item version of the RRS (Treynor et al., 2003) 
which included a 'reflection' factor (5-items) and a 'brooding' factor (5-items).  They included 
an additional five items intended to assess key dimensions of pathological and non-
pathological worry.  They reworded items to improve readability for an older British 
population (i.e. 'anglicised') and to reduce the level of abstraction (i.e. reworded to the first 
person).  They named this 15-item scale the adapted Ruminative Response Scale (aRRS).  
The aRRS was used by Hudson and Saling (2010) as one of their measures. 
 Carney et al. (2010) used the Symptom-focused rumination subscale (SYM) of the 
RRS (Bagby, Rector, Bacchiochi, & McBride, 2004).  This includes eight items from the 
RRS previously found to assess the tendency to think about symptoms.  Carney et al. (2010) 
used the SYM because it was the only measure of rumination which had previously been 
found to effectively distinguish between good and poor sleepers.  They adapted the SYM 
instructions so that participants were asked to respond to items in relation to the past week, 
rather than the past two weeks, so it was consistent with other measures being used. 
 Measuring worry.  The most frequently used measure of worry was the PSWQ 
(Meyer et al., 1990; see Table 3) which was used, either in its original format or an adapted 
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version, in 12 of the 15 studies.  Seven studies used the PSWQ in its original format with no 
rewording or adaptations, two studies used the children's version of the PSWQ (PSWQ-C; 
Chorpita, Tracey, Brown, Collica, & Barlow, 1997), two studies used previously adapted 
versions, and one study adapted their own version.  The two previously adapted versions of 
the PSWQ included the PSWQ-Past Week (PSWQ-PW; Stober & Bittencourt, 1998) and the 
worry engagement subscale of the PSWQ (Fresco et al., 2002).  The PSWQ-PW contains 15-
items from the PSWQ considered to assess state-dependent worry in relation to the past 
week.  This version has adapted the instructions so individuals consider their responses in 
relation to the past week, the items are phrased in the past tense, it uses a 0-6 Likert scale 
response (rather than a 0-5), and one item was removed as it reflected a trait-like phrase that 
did not match with the new time frame.  The worry engagement scale contains only the 11 
positively- worded items of the PSWQ which were found to represent one 'worry 
engagement' factor (Fresco et al., 2002).  The negatively coded items were removed as Fresco 
et al. (2002) found them to represent a separate factor described as the 'absence of worry'. 
 Adapting the PSWQ.  McEvoy et al. (2010) used the original version of the PSWQ 
but adjusted the wording to reduce the confounding effect of the word 'worry' (this was 
replaced with references to 'thoughts' or 'thinking').  They altered the instructions so 
individuals answered items in relation to a specific situation, and removed two items as they 
could not be meaningfully related to a specific situation. 
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Table 3 
Summary of studies using the PSWQ, including various versions, and other scales used to measure 
worry 
Measure No. of studies (%) Studies 
 Used PSWQ = 12 (80.0%)  
Original version (Meyer et al., 
1990) 
7 (46.7%) Ciesla et al. (2011); Fresco et al. (2002); 
Goring & Papageorgiou (2008); McEvoy & 
Brans (2013); Segerstrom et al. (2003); 
Siegle et al. (2004); van Rijsoort et al. 
(2001). 
Adapted for current study 
(wording adjusted and items 
removed/added) 
1 (6.7%) McEvoy et al. (2010). 
Previously adapted version 
(Worry engagement subscale, 
PSWQ-PW) 
2 (13.3%) Boschloo et al. (2012); Carney et al. (2010). 
Children's version (PSWQ-C) 2 (13.3%) Muris et al. (2004); Rood et al. (2010). 
 Used other measures = 3 (20.0%)  
Worry subscale of the aRRS 2 (13.3%) Hudson & Saling (2010); Rewston et al. 
(2007). 
Adapted WDQ for current study 1 (6.7%) Watkins et al. (2005). 
Note. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire, PSWQ-PW = PSWQ Past Week, PSWQ-C = PSWQ 
for children, aRRS = Adapted RRS, WDQ = Worry Domains Questionnaire. 
 Other measures used to measure worry.  One study developed a new measure of 
worry called the worry subscale of the aRRS (Rewston et al., 2007) and this was then 
subsequently used by one of the other studies (Hudson & Saling, 2010).  The aRRS is a 5-
item scale designed to assess key dimensions of pathological and non-pathological worry in 
older adults.  The dimensions of worry assessed, and subsequent corresponding items, were 
derived through a review of theoretical and empirical literature concerning worry.  These 
dimensions include: the reassurance-seeking element of worry, the problem-solving function 
of worry, the relationship between worry and uncertainty and the experience of anxious 
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physiological arousal, and the notion that worry might be characterised by attempts to 
predict, prepare for or avoid negative outcomes (Rewston et al., 2007). 
 One study (Watkins et al., 2005) used the worry domains questionnaire (WDQ; Tallis, 
Eysenck, & Mathews, 1992) which assesses the following 6 areas of typical worries: 
relationships, lack of confidence, aimless future, work incompetence, finances, and socio-
political concerns.  They adjusted the wording of the WDQ to be consistent with other 
measures of cognitive processes being administered (namely rumination and intrusive 
thoughts) and excluded one item that significantly overlapped with an item from the RRS. 
 Using multiple measures vs. single scales.  Four studies (Ciesla et al., 2011; Rood et 
at., 2010; Segerstrom et al., 2003; Siegle et al., 2004) used multiple measures of rumination 
for comparison purposes whereas no studies used multiple measures of worry.  This likely 
reflects the variation in how rumination is conceptualised in comparison to the more 
uniformly adopted concept of worry. 
1.4.5 Overlap and Distinction Between Rumination and Worry 
 As reported in Table 1, all but one study used factor analysis to compare rumination 
and worry.  In addition to factor analysis, one study (Segerstrom et al., 2003) used 
multidimensional scaling, one study used generalizability theory analysis (Siegle et al., 2004) 
and 11 reported correlation analysis results.  Watkins, Moulds and Mackintosh (2005) used 
paired samples t-tests to compare rumination and worry along a number of dimensions. 
 Factor analysis results.  Fourteen studies used factor analysis to compare the 
constructs of worry and rumination.  Three studies (Boschloo et al., 2013; McEvoy et al., 
2010; Siegle et al., 2004) found that rumination and worry loaded onto the same factor, five 
studies (McEvoy & Brans, 2013; Hudson & Saling, 2010; Goring & Papageorgiou, 2008; 
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Rewston et al., 2007; van Rijsoort et al., 2001) found mixed results, and six studies found that 
they loaded onto separate factors. 
 Rumination and worry loading on the same factor.  Of the three studies that found 
rumination and worry to load onto the same factor: McEvoy et al. (2010) reported a two-
factor model representing 'RNT' and 'absence of RNT'; Boschloo et al. (2012) reported a two-
factor model representing 'negative emotionality' (including both rumination and worry) and 
'impulsivity'; and Siegle et al. (2004) reported a four-factor model with Factor 1 representing 
'rumination on sadness, worry and otherwise negatively valenced trait rumination', Factor 2 
representing 'focus on a distant-past negative event', Factor 3 'valence-neutral reflection', and 
Factor 4 'alternate responses to rumination that do not clearly represent rumination'. 
 In conjunction with findings from generalizability analysis (discussed later), Siegle et 
al. (2004) conclude that rumination, including worry, can be conceived as one unitary 
construct.  They state that different measures reflect different rumination-like constructs and 
the multiple factors they found, represent plausible clusters of correlated rumination 
measures.  They highlight that the observed factors support the distinction between negative 
rumination and more reflective strategies but also suggest that some of the variation was 
accounted for by conceptual and stylistic differences between the measures.  They draw 
parallels to the valence (positive/negative) and purpose dimensions found among repetitive 
thought measures by Segerstrom et al. (2003).  Siegle et al. suggest that their findings fit with 
the valence dimension as scales that measured neutral reflection and alternate responses to 
emotional information, loaded on separate factors from negative rumination. 
 McEvoy et al. (2010) found an overlap between depressive rumination and worry 
measures using adapted versions of the RRS and the PSWQ; all positively worded items 
loaded on the same factor termed 'RNT'.  The authors adjusted the wording of both the RRS 
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and the PSWQ to minimise potential sources of method variance that could artificially 
distinguish between the measures.  They used general phrases like 'thoughts or images' for 
RRS items and references to 'thoughts' or 'thinking' for PSWQ items, and also adapted the 
instructions so that individuals answered all items in relation to a specific situation.  All 
positively worded items of the PSWQ (e.g. "I knew I shouldn't have thought about the 
situation, but I couldn't help it") and the RRS (e.g. "You had thoughts or images about how 
alone you felt") loaded on the RNT factor.  The second identified factor, the 'absence of 
repetitive thinking', contained all negatively worded items of the PSWQ (e.g. "I found it easy 
to dismiss distressing thoughts about the situation).  They proposed that rumination and 
worry are less distinct than suggested by previous factor analytic studies as their findings 
imply that use of the term 'worry' in all PSWQ items may have been why PSWQ items and 
rumination measure items tended to load on separate factors. 
 Boschloo et al. (2013) also found a clear overlap between rumination and worry.  
They used a different measure of rumination (the 'rumination reactivity' subscale of the 
LEIDS-R) which measures ruminative response to sad mood and an adapted version of the 
PSWQ (the worry engagement subscale; Fresco et al., 2002) which only included positively 
worded PSWQ items.  These measures were similar to those used by McEvoy et al. (2010).  
Boschloo et al. did not give sufficient detail on their method of factor analysis but they 
appeared to use total scores for the scales rather than individual items and found that both 
rumination and worry loaded on a factor identified as 'negative emotionality'.  They described 
this as a homogenous factor as the constructs included (neuroticism, hopelessness, 
rumination, worry, and anxiety sensitivity) were highly interrelated (ranging from r = 0.45 to 
r = 0.81). 
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 Rumination and worry loading partly on the same and partly on different factors.  
McEvoy and Brans (2013) found that rumination (separated into brooding and reflection on 
an adapted version of the RRS) and worry (as measured by the PSWQ) loaded onto three 
distinct factors but the best fitting model was when the three components were nested in a 
'general RNT' factor.  They conclude that rumination and worry had both common and 
distinct variance and that this should be conceptualised as common variance rather than 
considering RNT as a higher-order factor.  Worry was more strongly related to RNT than 
brooding or reflection suggesting these scales as more distinct from the underlying factor of 
RNT than worry.  Van Rijsoort et al. (2001) reported that items from the rumination subscale 
of the PI-R and items from the PSWQ loaded onto separate factors because the difference 
between the eigenvalues of each item between its own assigned factor and the others were all 
greater than .10.  They used multiple group method confirmatory analysis to investigate the 
proposed 5-factor structure of the PI-R in addition to the factor of worry as measured by the 
PSWQ; therefore confirming a 6-factor model.  However, on inspection of the table reporting 
the eigenvalues, the majority of items from the PSWQ loaded onto the rumination factor 
(>.4) and conversely the majority of the items on the rumination measure loaded onto the 
worry factor (>.4).  This is not explicitly discussed by the authors but has implications for the 
distinction between rumination and worry as measured by these scales. 
 Three studies reported rumination and worry loading onto multiple distinct factors but 
with some exceptions.  Goring and Papageorgiou (2008) found a four-factor model including 
the following factors: 'tendency to worry', 'tendency to analyse feelings/self', 'dwelling on 
negative feelings', and 'absence of worry'.  These represented a variation of scale items: 
tendency to worry was made up of 11 positively worded PSWQ items (these items 
correspond exactly to the worry engagement subscale of the PSWQ) and three RRS items; the 
second and third factors were both made up of different RRS items and could arguably be 
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conceived as neutral reflection and negative rumination; and the 'absence of worry' factor was 
made up of four reverse-scored items of the PSWQ (similar to Boschloo et al., 2013 and 
Fresco et al., 2002).  Similarly, both Hudson and Saling (2010) and Rewston et al. (2007) 
found three-factor models of brooding, reflection, and worry but with some items loading on 
one of the other factors.  Hudson and Saling (2010) used the aRRS and found that odd items 
from the brooding subscale and worry subscale loaded on the opposite factor, while the 
reflection subscale items all loaded on one factor.  They found good internal consistency for 
each factor (α = 0.77-0.80) and all three factors significantly and positively correlated with 
one another.  Rewston et al. (2007) also used the aRRS and found some items from each of 
the brooding, reflection and worry subscales loading on opposite factors. 
 With the exception of van Rijsoort et al. (2001) who used the PI-R to measure 
rumination, all other studies who found mixed evidence for the degree of overlap between 
rumination and worry, used a version of the RRS.  Similar to previous studies (Treynor et al., 
2003), all those who used a version of the RRS reported a distinction between negative 
rumination or brooding, and reflection. 
 Rumination and worry loading on separate factors.  Rood et al. (2010) found that 
PSWQ-C items measuring worry, CRSS items measuring rumination on sad mood, and 
SRRS-C items measuring negative thoughts about negative inferences following stressful 
events, all loaded on three separate factors distinctly representing each individual scale.  
Ciesla et al. (2011) found a four-factor model with items from each individual scale loading 
exclusively on factors specific to their corresponding construct; that is, all RRS items loaded 
on one factor, all PSWQ factors loaded on another, and so on for both angry rumination and 
co-rumination.  Both of these studies report factors clearly represented by specific scale items 
yet only Rood et al. (2010) acknowledge that these differences could potentially be related to 
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methodological differences in the wording of the scales.  This is likely to have been an issue 
as some items from the CRSS (e.g. "When I'm feeling sad, I think about something that 
happened and wish it had gone better") were relatively comparable with items on the SRRS-
C (e.g. "I think about the stressful event and wish it had gone better"), yet they loaded on 
separate factors.  All of the PSWQ-C items included a variant of the term 'worry' while none 
of the other scales did.  All of the CRSS items started with the phrase "When I'm feeling sad, 
I...", while all of the SRRS-C items started with "I think about...", and then make reference to 
a particular stressful event identified by the child or adolescent.  These methodological 
distinctions, use of the specific term that is being measured or assessing trait constructs 
versus mood- and situation-dependent states, are likely to result in different outcomes. 
 Segerstrom et al. (2003) found eight factors with each rumination-like construct scale 
forming its own factor.  The only exceptions were the Rumination Scale (Martin, Tesser, & 
McIntosh, 1993) and the RRS which appeared to be internally multidimensional; both of 
these scales were individually factor analysed.  The Rumination Scale loaded onto two 
factors: 'lack of control over thoughts and distractibility' and 'cognitive rehearsal and 
processing'.  The RRS loaded onto three factors: 'focus on depressive symptoms', 'self-
analysis', and 'self-reproach' with Factors 1 and 3 highly correlated (r = .65).  Both of these 
scales appear to fit with a distinction between rumination and reflection.  Muris et al. (2004) 
found that all PSWQ-C items loaded on one 'worry' factor while CRSS items either loaded 
onto one 'rumination' factor or two factors reflecting 'dwelling on negative feelings' and 
'analysing what went wrong'.  Again, this would appear to distinguish rumination from a 
more adaptive reflective cognitive approach. 
 Fresco et al. (2002) found that items from the RRS and the PSWQ, each loaded onto 
two separate factors.  Positively worded PSWQ items loaded on one factor ('worry 
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engagement') and negatively worded items loaded on another ('absence of worry').  The RRS 
items loaded onto two factors identified as 'dwelling on the negative' and 'active cognitive 
appraisal'.  There was no overlap between scale items on factors although one PSWQ item 
and three RRS items were dropped due to low factor loadings.  Similarly Carney et al. (2010) 
found that all positively worded PSWQ items loaded onto one factor while all of the 
negatively worded PSWQ items loaded on a separate factor, but that all items from the 
Symptom-focused Rumination scale loaded on one third factor.  As the Symptom-focused 
Rumination scale consists of items from the RRS that focus on depressive symptoms only 
and does not contain any reflection items, it is logical that rumination, as measured by these 
items, was found to load on one coherent factor.  All studies that found rumination and worry 
to load on distinct factors, identified factors that matched, almost identically, to the separate 
scale items being analysed (i.e. RRS items loaded on one or more factor while PSWQ items 
loaded on separate factors). 
 Other methods of comparison.  Eleven studies reported carrying out correlation 
analysis and all found significant positive relationships between measures of rumination and 
worry.  Only one study (Siegle et al., 2004) reported no significant relationship between 
brooding and worry but did report a relationship between brooding and reflection, and 
between reflection and worry. 
 Watkins et al. (2005) used paired samples t-tests to compare worry and rumination 
across a number of variables.  They found that, of 53 variables on an adapted version of the 
Cognitive Intrusions Questionnaire (CIQ; Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 
1992), only seven showed a significant difference between worrisome thoughts and 
ruminative thoughts.  The differences observed included: chronicity, with worry reported to 
be ongoing for a greater number of years; temporal orientation, with rumination more about 
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the past and worry more about the future; 'realness', with rumination viewed as being about a 
'real' problem; distress, with worry rated as more upsetting and disturbing; and worry was 
associated with greater feelings of insecurity and worry than rumination. 
 Segerstrom et al. (2003) used multidimensional scaling to compare rumination and 
worry.  They found that multiple measures of repetitive thought could be compared along two 
dimensions: 1. Valence - positive versus negative content valence; and 2. Purpose - searching 
for new ideas/experiences versus solving problems and improving certainty and 
predictability.  Rumination and worry both fell on the negative end of the content valence 
dimension and both fell on the problem-solving end of the purpose dimension, however, 
worry appeared further towards problem-solving and improving certainty and predictability 
than rumination. 
 Siegle et al. (2004) conducted a generalizability theory analysis to examine the extent 
to which multiple measures of rumination-like constructs indexed the same construct.  The 
analysis found that 22-30% of the variance was accounted for by stable differences between 
individuals, suggesting that some individuals scored highly on the measures no matter how it 
was assessed.  The majority of variance, 70-78%, was accounted for by individual by scale 
interactions, suggesting that individuals did not consistently score high or low on all 
questionnaires.  Siegle et al. state that this indicates a low to moderate level of 
generalizability which implies that different measures probably assess different constructs 
because individuals tended to score differently on different scales.  However, they also found 
a considerable level of between-scale consistency (α = .85) and proposed that this was an 
indication that a mean of multiple rumination measures appear to index a single unitary 
construct.  Siegle et al. highlighted multiple possible reasons why different questionnaires 
provoked different responses from the same individuals.  Based on their findings, they 
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suggest the conceptual distinctions between measures are a likely explanation for observed 
variation in responses, as many of the scales took different approaches (e.g. rumination on 
internal vs. external events, state vs. trait variables).  This view was supported by discussions 
with participants after testing which indicated that some individuals responded differently to 
measures depending on the event they chose to answer the questions in relation to (i.e. a 
particular stressful experience) and based on how the instructions and the question items were 
worded.   
1.4.6 Rumination and Worry as Similar or Distinct Processes 
 Thirteen of the studies concluded that rumination and worry are similar processes that 
share a degree of overlap but are still distinguished from one another.  Some suggest their 
distinctness to be related to the content of each thinking style, predominantly referencing that 
rumination and worry have repeatedly been evidenced to differ in terms of temporal 
orientation.  One study (McEvoy & Brans, 2013) proposed that the shared variance between 
measures of rumination and worry is best conceptualised as common variance, rather than in 
relation to a higher order factor of RNT.  McEvoy and Brans (2013) proposed partial support 
for the transdiagnostic hypothesis of repetitive thought, as rumination and worry measures 
had both common and distinct variance.  Segerstrom et al. (2003), who compared the two 
constructs in terms of valence and purpose dimensions, concluded that rumination and worry 
could be conceptualised as a unified construct despite the finding that they differed somewhat 
in terms of their intended purpose (i.e. searching or solving). 
 Rewston et al. (2007) proposed that worry, brooding and reflection are separable 
factors that appear to fit with suggestions that worry and rumination are functionally distinct 
ways of thinking (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004; Watkins, 2004).  Conversely, Boschloo et al. 
33 
 
(2012) concluded that negative emotionality, consisting of both rumination and worry, 
formed a homogeneous dimension. 
1.5 Discussion 
 The findings reported here highlight the difficulty in establishing how similar or 
distinct, the concepts of rumination and worry are from each other.  The majority of studies 
directly comparing rumination and worry have reported inconclusive, or only partially 
supported, findings.  One coherent message across studies is that, rumination and worry are 
definitely related in some way but also appear to maintain some degree of distinctness.  What 
remains uncertain is the relationship between rumination and worry and why they sometimes 
appear similar and sometimes distinct.  This adds to the difficulty in concluding whether they 
can be conceptualised within one unitary process (i.e. RNT). 
 The most frequent conceptualisation of rumination was Nolen-Hoeksema's (1991) 
RST of depressive rumination.  This conceptualisation corresponds with the use of the RRS 
as a means of measuring rumination, although, two studies acknowledged that rumination has 
multiple definitions and therefore used multiple measures of rumination.  Numerous studies 
considered rumination to be a multi-faceted construct that loads onto more than one factor.  
The most common pattern found was the distinction of rumination into a brooding-type 
construct and a reflective-type construct.  As the majority of studies used the RRS, this 
distinction fits with previous findings (Treynor et al., 2003).  A large proportion of studies 
used Borkovec et al.'s (1983) definition of worry or a congruent conceptualisation of the 
construct.  This conceptualisation of worry was compatible with using the PSWQ as a 
measurement tool.  Rewston et al. (2007) used a broader conceptualisation of worry that 
included a definition by Borkovec (1994), to develop a new measure of worry contained 
within the aRRS.  Worry appeared to be a more coherent construct with studies only 
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reporting two distinct factors, at most, namely the presence or absence of worry.  It was 
commonly noted that this distinction corresponded with positively and negatively worded 
items of the PSWQ.  A small number of studies adopted a view from the outset, that worry 
was a cognitive process comparable with rumination (i.e. they could be conceptualised in 
similar ways). 
 Arguably Nolen-Hoeksema's RST of depressive rumination and Borkovec's definition 
of worry appear to be compatible conceptualisations.  They both regard rumination and 
worry, respectively, as responses to negative affect.  Depressive rumination is viewed as a 
response to low mood, while worry as a response to fear of potential negative outcomes 
(conceivably similar to anxiety).  In keeping with the findings of a review of the constructs 
(Watkins, 2008), the conceptualisations only appear to differ in terms of their content: 
depressive rumination is purported to focus on depressive symptoms while worry is 
conceived of as focusing on any potential feared negative outcome.  This indicates that, if 
measures of the constructs include reference to the content of ruminative or worry thoughts, 
then they are likely to find a difference between them.  If they only focused on the process of 
both constructs, it is hypothesised that they would potentially appear more similar.  The RRS 
contains items relating specifically to depressive symptoms (e.g. 'Think about your feelings 
of fatigue and achiness') and these have been found to overlap with items from the Beck 
Depression Inventory that measure depression (Treynor et al., 2003).  The instructions also 
ask people to respond to items in relation to when they feel depressed.  Items on the RRS are 
phrased so that they ask about the specific content of thoughts (e.g. 'Think "What am I doing 
to deserve this?"').  Conversely, the PSWQ does not refer to the specific content of worry 
thoughts, but concentrates on the process of worrying (e.g. 'I find it easy to dismiss 
worrisome thoughts'); albeit they do use the term worry to describe this process.  The reason 
for the PSWQ focusing on process rather than content, is likely due to the large number of 
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possible feared negative outcomes that people may hold and the difficulty in trying to account 
for such variability in the content of one scale.  Depressive rumination on the other hand, 
refers to the process of ruminating but only in relation to one specific event, that is, when 
people are depressed.  This is potentially why the RRS has developed more of a content-focus 
in its items.  This distinction in the underlying conceptualisation of the RRS and the PSWQ, 
has implications for comparing rumination and worry as measured by these scales. 
 The finding by McEvoy and Brans (2013), that rumination factors from an adapted 
version of the RRS (i.e. brooding and reflection) were more distinct from a general RNT 
factor than worry, as measured by the PSWQ, is in keeping with this distinction.  The PSWQ 
may have been more compatible with an overarching construct of RNT because it measures a 
compatible process, whereas the content of brooding and reflective type thinking, is harder to 
compare with a general process of RNT.  Comparing the 'content' of rumination to the 
'process' of worry, is likely to produce distinguishable results.  As highlighted here, the 
majority of studies that found rumination and worry to load onto separate factors, used a 
version of the RRS and the PSWQ.  Whereas, the studies that found rumination and worry to 
be comparable, either used adapted versions of these measures or else used entirely different 
measures.  This finding supports the hypothesis that a large proportion of the variance 
observed between the constructs can be attributed to methodological variation in the scales 
rather than differences in rumination and worry per se (Watkins et al., 2005; McEvoy et al., 
2010). 
 The studies that made attempts to address these methodological variations did observe 
more coherence between rumination and worry than those that didn't.  This implies that 
rumination and worry could indeed be comparable constructs when measured in compatible 
ways, namely in terms of process rather than content.  If rumination were measured in a more 
36 
 
similar way to how the PSWQ measures worry, although references to worry or rumination 
would need to be replaced with generic references to thoughts or thinking, it would allow for 
a more valid comparison.  This hypothesis warrants further investigation to support the claim 
that when methodological variance is removed, rumination and worry appear to represent a 
similar construct.  This view has already been accepted by some researchers and can be seen 
in more recently developed measures of RNT as a unitary process, for example the PTQ 
(Ehring et al., 2011).  Ehring et al. have attempted to remove all diagnosis-specific content 
and develop a transdiagnostic measure of RNT.  The 15-item measure is comprised of three 
items representing each of the five assumed characteristics of RNT; that is, RNT is repetitive, 
intrusive, difficult to disengage from, unproductive, and captures mental capacity (i.e. 
difficult to concentrate on other things).  This measure adopts a universal approach to 
assessing RNT as a process and does not include disorder-specific content.  This marks a shift 
away from the conceptualisation of rumination and worry as separate constructs, towards 
conceptualising RNT as a meta-process entailing all types of RT that are negative.  In light of 
the findings from this review, this approach appears to be relatively valid but is not without 
some caution.  The step of comparing rumination and worry on methodologically comparable 
scales has only been carried out in a few studies (McEvoy & Brans, 2013; McEvoy et al., 
2010; Watkins et al., 2005) and further replication would strengthen the evidence for 
considering them as a unitary construct. 
1.6 Clinical Implications 
 Rumination and worry are routinely measured in clinical settings.  Rumination is 
considered to be a risk factor for developing depression (Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001) and 
worry is seen as an essential criteria in the diagnosis of generalised anxiety disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  Measuring these constructs homogeneously 
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clearly has implications for the assessment and diagnosis of mental health problems.  RNT is 
still considered to differ in terms of content (Watkins, 2008), even if the underlying process is 
proposed to be unitary.  This disparity in content is likely to be seen across individuals and 
has been shown across different distinctions of mental health diagnoses (Ehring & Watkins, 
2008).  Considering the degree of variation in thought content, and the finding that 
rumination and worry are present across a range of emotional problems, having a uniform 
way of measuring the extent to which people engage in the process of RNT seems a more 
parsimonious approach.  Additionally, some forms of RT have been found to have 
constructive consequences and are considered adaptive strategies (Segerstrom et al., 2003; 
Watkins, 2008); therefore, the need to distinguish between helpful and unhelpful RT appears 
more relevant to assessing such processes, and would likely hold more implications for 
clinical outcomes. 
1.7 Limitations 
 This review has a number of methodological limitations.  First, due to increasing 
interest in the constructs of rumination and worry, the initial search of the literature returned a 
large volume of studies.  The extent of the research was too vast to be meaningfully compiled 
within one review.  As a result, additional excluding criteria were imposed, namely the 
exclusion of studies that investigated rumination and worry in relation to a third variable.  
These studies would have likely increased the complexity of the findings while offering a 
more comprehensive overview.  However, the difficulty of synthesising this quantity of data 
resulted in only including studies that directly compared rumination and worry with each 
other.  This also had the consequence of most included studies using factor analytic methods 
to compare the constructs with one another.  There does not appear to be a standardised way 
of comparing factor analytic results as there is for other methodological approaches (e.g. 
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effect size) and therefore, studies were compared on their methodological quality and the 
number of factors they reported. 
1.8 Conclusions 
 This review tentatively concludes that when rumination and worry are measured by 
conceptually distinct scales, namely the RRS and the PSWQ respectively, this translates into 
differences observed in study findings.  That is, when rumination is measured by the RRS 
and worry is measured by the PSWQ, they are found to be distinct constructs.  However, on 
the few occasions when attempts have been made to remove methodological variations, 
rumination and worry appear to be similar processes.  It is therefore feasible to conceptualise 
them within a unitary construct of RNT but further confirmatory research would strengthen 
this conclusion.  A unitary measure of RNT has clinical implications in terms of assessing the 
extent to which people engage in the process of unhelpful, rather than helpful, RT. 
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CHAPTER 2: EMPIRICAL PAPER 
2.1 Abstract
2 
Rumination and worry are considered similar types of repetitive-negative-thinking (RNT) 
related to mental health difficulties.  Ability to disengage from RNT is associated with 
mindfulness, which is related to greater well-being.  Evidence suggests goal-linkers ruminate 
more, but the relationship between goal-linking and worry has not yet been investigated.  The 
aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between goal-linking and RNT, and the 
impact on mental health/well-being.  A non-clinical sample of 186 UK University students 
completed an online questionnaire survey.  As predicted, goal-linking was significantly 
associated with RNT, mindfulness, anxious/depressive symptoms, and well-being.  Goal-
linkers showed significantly greater RNT than non-linkers, and were less mindful.  Goal-
linking predicted anxious/depressive symptoms and this prediction strengthened when people 
engaged in RNT.  The relationship between goal-linking and anxious/depressive symptoms 
was mediated by RNT, while the relationship between goal-linking and well-being was 
mediated by mindfulness.  Mindfulness training is suggested to help goal-linkers disengage 
from RNT. 
Keywords: Goal-linking, repetitive negative thinking, rumination, worry, mindfulness, 
depression, anxiety, well-being 
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The mediating effect of repetitive negative thinking and mindfulness on the relationship 
between goal-linking and mental health and well-being 
2.2 Introduction 
  Rumination has received much attention in the clinical literature over the past 
two decades although there still appears to be no unified definition and no standard means of 
measurement (Smith & Alloy, 2009).  In their extensive review of the construct, Smith and 
Alloy (2009) state that rumination is a cognitive process best characterised as "a stable, 
negative, broadly construed way of responding to discrepancies between current status and 
target status" (p.126).  They suggest that rumination fits within the broader theoretical 
framework of emotion regulation in that ruminating is an attempt to resolve the perceived 
discrepancy between where one is (current status) and where one would like to be (target 
status) and the negative affect that is likely to accompany that state.  Smith and Alloy 
conclude that positive metacognitive beliefs about the efficacy of rumination encourage 
engagement in this strategy but that ultimately, rumination serves to avoid processing 
negative emotion.  According to Hayes and colleagues theory of avoidance (2004), avoiding 
negative affect paradoxically increases the experience of it.  It is therefore not surprising that 
rumination has consistently demonstrated a strong relationship with depression (Mor & 
Winquist, 2002) and ruminating in response to distress is associated with increased severity 
and length of episodes of depressed mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
 Worry is most commonly defined as: "a chain of thoughts and images, negatively 
affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable" (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & Depree, 1983, 
p.10).  Borkovec and colleagues (1983) suggest that worrying is a form of mental problem-
solving when the outcome of something remains uncertain but has the potential to be 
negative; they note how closely worry relates to the fear process.  Borkovec's avoidance 
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theory of worry (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998) proposes that worry is a 
mostly verbal, rather than imagery-based, cognitive activity aimed at avoiding perceived 
threat.  Similar to the theory posited for rumination, Borkovec's theory argues that people 
hold positive metacognitive beliefs about the efficacy of worry in helping to avoid threat.  
However, by not processing the emotion related to the prospect of the feared negative 
outcome, the individual remains afraid of the outcome occurring and hence experiences 
increased persistent feelings of anxiety.   Worry has most commonly been studied in relation 
to anxiety (Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002) and is seen as an essential 
feature of generalised anxiety disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
2.2.1 Rumination and Worry as RNT 
 Despite the established link between rumination and worry with depression and 
anxiety respectively, it is becoming more widely accepted that both processes are present 
across a range of mental health disorders (for a review see Ehring & Watkins, 2008).  This 
has led to growing consideration of rumination and worry as part of the same overarching 
meta-process known as repetitive negative thinking (RNT).  RNT is a term used to describe 
cognitive processes that involve recurring thoughts about negative topics that are experienced 
as difficult to control (Ehring & Watkins, 2008).  Ehring and Watkins note that the content 
between rumination and worry only tend to differ specifically in relation to temporal 
orientation; that is, rumination appears to focus on past negative experiences while worry 
focuses on future concerns.  Repetitive thought (RT) as a general, rather than a specifically 
negative, overarching process which includes both rumination and worry, has been found to 
vary along two dimensions: the valence of RTs can range from positive, to neutral, to 
negative, and people can engage in repetitive thinking for reasons that span from a searching 
to a solving purpose (Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & Shortridge, 2003).  These findings imply 
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that rumination and worry can theoretically be conceptualised as a unitary cognitive process 
and while they may differ in terms of content and purpose, they function in a relatively 
similar manner.  Whilst some consider them to be part of the same construct (Boschloo, 
Vogelzangs, van den Brink, Smit, Beekman, & Penninx, 2013), others see them as distinct 
processes that share common variance (McEvoy & Brans, 2013).  The differences observed 
between rumination and worry may be due to methodological variations in measurement 
tools as removing these methodological confounds can eliminate the differences detected 
(McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 2010).  This has led to the development of transdiagnostic 
measures that assess RNT without reference to disorder-specific content or symptoms, such 
as, the Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring, Zetsche, Weidacker, Wahl, 
Schonfeld, & Ehlers, 2011) and the Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire (McEvoy, Mahoney, 
& Moulds, 2010).  These measures show promising validity and reliability in measuring 
worry and rumination as a general construct. 
2.2.2 Goal Progress Theory 
 Goal progress theory (Martin, Tesser, & McIntosh, 1993) states that rumination 
occurs in response to failure to progress, as expected, towards a significant goal.  In his 
review of constructive and unconstructive RT, Watkins (2008) expands on goal progress 
theory and describes an integrative overview of control theory of RT.  Control theory 
(Wiener, 1961) proposes that all behaviour, including mental activity, are part of a feedback 
process so that when a discrepancy is perceived between the current state, as compared to 
some reference value (e.g. goals, desired states), behaviour is modified to attempt to resolve 
this discrepancy (Carver & Scheier, 1982).  Watkins (2008) argues that RT is one such self-
regulatory attempt to resolve perceived discrepancies and that RT will continue until the 
desired progress is made or until the person disengages from the goal.  He concludes that the 
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consequences of RT depend on three factors: thought valence (positive or negative thoughts), 
the context within which RT occurs (RT amplifies existing context such as beliefs, 
expectations, mood states), and the level of construal adopted during RT (higher level 
abstract representations vs. lower level concrete specificities; Watkins, 2008).  Beliefs and 
expectations about the self play an important role in how people respond to perceived 
discrepancies between current and desired states (Carver & Scheier, 1990); whether these  
expectations are positive or negative will influence whether RT is helpful or not.  For 
example, negative expectations about success may lead to reduced persistence at goal pursuit 
which will increase the discrepancy level and have a negative effect on mood.  Mood states 
can also impact the consequences of RT as negative mood can lead to higher standards of 
success making it harder to resolve discrepancies (Cervone, Kopp, Schaumann, & Scott, 
1994).  Goals and behaviours are hierarchically organised with more abstract, superordinate 
levels influencing more concrete, subordinate levels (Martin et al., 1993).  The former are 
hypothesised to be more helpful for goal progress in familiar, unproblematic, or positive 
situations and the latter in novel or problematic situations or with unattainable goals 
(Watkins, 2008; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004).  Watkins 
concludes that RT can be adaptive but under certain conditions, it can have unhelpful 
consequences. 
2.2.3 Goal-linking 
 Goal-linking is the concept that people vary on the degree to which they link lower-
order goals to higher-order ones, with linkers (i.e. those high on this tendency) believing that 
higher-order goals are contingent on the outcome of lower-order goals (e.g. 'I must get that 
job in order to be happy'; McIntosh & Martin, 1992).  While goals are believed to be 
organised hierarchically, with lower-order goals contributing to higher-order goals 
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(McIntosh, 1996), non-linkers (i.e. those not high on the tendency) do not believe that goals 
higher up the hierarchy are dependent on the achievement of every lower-order goal beneath 
it (e.g. 'I can still be happy even if I don't get that job').  McIntosh, Harlow, and Martin 
(1995) argue that linkers ruminate more because of their belief that all goals, even seemingly 
trivial ones, are instrumental in achieving more superordinate goals, referred to in the goal 
literature as personal strivings (Emmons, 1989).  This influences linkers' interpretation and 
response towards threats to achieving their goals.  In other words, linkers are more 
susceptible to responding to a discrepancy between their current and desired state because the 
desired state is likely to hold greater significance (e.g. to be happy).  The higher a goal is in 
the hierarchy the more enduring it tends to be (Emmons, 1989) and the more abstract 
(McIntosh, 1996).  One proposition for why higher-order goals tend to be more enduring is 
that their abstract nature makes it more difficult to ascertain whether progress is being made 
or whether the goal has been fulfilled (McIntosh, 1996).  For linkers, this suggests they are 
unlikely to disengage from a goal because the reference value they are striving towards may 
be vague but very salient and their sensitivity to goal threat is high (McIntosh, 1996), so they 
ruminate more frequently and more continuously (McIntosh et al., 1995).  This hypothesis is 
consistent with Watkins' (2008) control theory of RT.  This implies that linkers may be more 
prone to negative consequences of RT because they hold negative beliefs about not attaining 
their goals as well as the tendency to set more abstract reference values that are likely to be 
enduring; this may lead to difficulty if goals are problematic or unattainable.  By placing 
higher significance on achieving everyday goals to fulfil more meaningful personal strivings, 
it is conceivable that linkers would also be more likely to use worry as a problem-solving 
strategy, however, to the best of the author's knowledge, this relation is yet to be empirically 
explored.  With increased engagement in worry, anxiety would also be expected to increase. 
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2.2.4 Goal-linking and Mindfulness 
 The tendency of linkers to focus on abstract personal strivings, while regularly noting 
discrepancies between current and target status, appears incongruous to accepting the present 
moment.  The quality of 'non-striving', having no other goal than being yourself as you 
currently are (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), has been proposed to foster the ability to re-evaluate, or 
disengage from, problematic goals as a way of regulating discrepancies (Crane et al, 2008).  
'Non-striving' is recognised as an essential attitudinal element of mindfulness (Kabat-Zinn, 
1990).  Mindfulness is described as 'paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the 
present moment, non-judgementally' (Kabat-Zinn, 1994).  Being 'mindful' is being aware of 
present moment  experiences, so that thoughts, feelings, or sensations that arise, are 
acknowledged and accepted rather than actively engaged with (Bishop et al., 2004); a concept 
often referred to in Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & 
Teasdale, 2002) as decentering.  Cultivating mindfulness through training is associated with 
promoting greater levels of well-being (Brown & Ryan, 2003), improving acute symptoms of 
anxiety and depression (for a review see Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt & Oh, 2010), reducing 
relapse rates of depression (for a review see Piet & Hougaard, 2011), and reducing the 
frequency of negative automatic thoughts as well as increasing perceived ability to disengage 
from negative thinking (Frewen, Evans, Maraj, Dozois, & Partridge, 2008). 
 Trait mindfulness has been associated with lower levels of rumination (Frewen et al., 
2008; Raes, Dewulf, Van Heeringen, & Williams, 2009; Raes & Williams, 2010) and 
rumination has been found to decrease after engaging in mindfulness-based interventions 
(Deyo, Wilson, Ong, & Koopman, 2009; Raes et al., 2009).  Based on their findings, Raes 
and Williams (2010) propose that greater skill in mindful awareness, either occurring 
naturally or cultivated through training, improves people's ability to notice when they are 
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ruminating, to decenter from their thoughts and feelings, and subsequently disengage from 
this maladaptive self-perpetuating reactive pattern.  Higher levels of mindful awareness and 
accepting without judgement is associated with lower levels of brooding, and as a result 
lower levels of depressive symptomatology (Alleva, Roelofs, Voncken, Meevissen, & 
Alberts, 2014).  Additionally, rumination and worry have been found to be more abstract 
forms of thinking (Goldwin & Behar, 2012), whereas mindfulness is paying attention to 
current experience in a concrete way.  According to Watkins (2008), a concrete style of 
thought is more helpful when there is perceived threat to achieving a goal.  This implies that 
linkers are less likely to be mindful or potentially the inverse, that being mindful reduces the 
tendency to link.  While having a personally meaningful goal is related to better well-being, 
the discrepancy between current and desired states is considered to create negative affect 
(Carver & Scheier, 1998).  If this discrepancy remains, as is suggested with linkers, it is 
likely to have a detrimental impact on mental well-being. 
2.2.5 Aims and Hypotheses 
 This study aims to: 1. test the predicted relationships between the concepts of goal-
linking, RNT (including rumination, worry, and RNT measured as a universal construct), and 
mindfulness; 2. examine if linkers are less mindful and engage in more RNT than non-
linkers; and 3. investigate the hypotheses that goal-linking and RNT together are predictive of 
depressive and anxious symptoms, while goal-linking and mindfulness are predictive of well-
being.  The constructs of goal-linking, RNT (including both rumination and worry), and 
mindfulness, are all conceptualised as trait tendencies and thus are not limited to a clinical 
sample.  Given the lack of consensus in the literature, and as some relationships have not 
previously been examined, the current study investigates the key considerations in a non-
clinical adult population, in the absence of a diagnosis of mental health difficulties. 
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 The hypotheses are seven-fold:  First, goal-linking will be positively correlated with 
RNT, rumination, worry, depression, and anxiety; and second, will be negatively correlated 
with mindfulness and well-being.  Third, linkers will engage in significantly more RNT than 
non-linkers; and fourth, linkers will be less mindful than non-linkers.  Fifth, goal-linking will 
predict depression and this relationship will be mediated by RNT; sixth, goal-linking will 
predict anxiety and this relationship will be mediated by RNT; and finally, goal-linking will 
predict well-being and this relationship will be mediated by mindfulness. 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Participants 
 Two hundred and thirty four undergraduate and postgraduate students from four 
Universities in the UK consented to take part in the study.  Thirty two people did not 
complete any further information and some only provided demographic information (n=36).  
There were no significant differences between completers and non-completers.  After 
removing non-completers from the study, the total sample included in the analysis was 
N=186, although 23 of these only provided partial data.  Of the total sample (N=186), 143 
were female (76.9%) and 43 were male (23.1%).  The mean age was 24.56 years (SD=0.51, 
range=18-67), with 36.0% aged 18-20 years, 51.6% aged 21-30 years, 9.2% aged 31-40 
years, and 3.2% aged 41-67 years.  The majority of the sample classified themselves as White 
(n=153, 82.3%), then Chinese (n=13, 7.0%), Mixed Race (n=11, 5.9%), Asian (n=9, 4.8%), 
and nobody classified themselves as Black.  Students predominantly attended the main 
recruitment University based in the Northwest of England (n=149, 80.1%), followed by a 
University in Northern Ireland (n=30, 16.1%), and the remainder of people attended one of 
the other two recruitment Universities in the UK (n=7, 3.8%). 
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2.3.2 Sampling, Power Analysis, and Ethics Statement 
 A convenience sample of University students was used.  The study was advertised to 
all undergraduate and postgraduate students via the intranet of the main recruitment 
University.  The study was also advertised via email to psychology students of three other 
UK Universities.  Institutional and ethical approval was obtained from the main recruitment 
University and permission granted from the Heads of Psychology Departments to advertise in 
the other Universities. 
In the behavioural sciences, Cohen (1988) recommends researchers recruit sufficient 
participants to detect .80 power at an alpha of .05.  Using these parameters a power analysis 
using G-Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was conducted to detect a medium 
effect for correlation analysis, independent samples t-test, and linear regression analysis.  The 
power analysis calculations suggested that at least 38 participants were needed to have 
adequate statistical power for correlation analyses, at least 70 participants were needed for 
independent samples t-test, and at least 107 participants were needed for linear regression 
using two predictor variables.  Using bootstrapped confidence intervals improves the power 
of mediation analysis and requires less assumptions about normal distribution (Hayes, 2013).  
As bootstrapping resamples the data within the available sample thousands of times, no 
agreement on the minimum required sample size to carry out this analysis has been met. 
2.3.3 Design 
 This study was a cross sectional, online, internet study. 
2.3.4 Measures 
 The internal consistency of all measures was assessed using Cronbach Alpha (Field, 
2009).  In the current study, Cronbach Alpha for all measures was above the acceptable cut-
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off of 0.7 or above (DeVellis, 2003) and were consistent with values reported in existing 
research with non-clinical samples (see Table 4). 
 Goal linking: Linking Inventory (McIntosh, Harlow, & Martin, 1995).  The 
linking inventory is a 22-item self-report measure that assesses the extent to which people 
believe their happiness is contingent on objective outcomes.  It offers participants a forced-
choice response to items, choosing between one answer that represents a belief that their 
happiness is conditional on the attainment of certain outcomes (a linker), and one that 
indicates that their happiness is not directly dependent on such an outcome (a non-linker).  A 
linking response is scored 1 and a non-linking response is scored 0 giving a range from 0-22 
with higher scores indicating a higher tendency to link.  This scale has demonstrated 
reasonable internal consistency (α=.78) and good test-retest reliability (r=.78; McIntosh, 
Harlow, & Martin, 1995). 
 Rumination: Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Treynor, Gonazalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003).  The RRS is a 22-item self-report measure that assesses the tendency to 
engage in rumination in response to low-mood.  It measures frequency by asking respondents 
to rate how often they engage in each item on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 
4 (almost always).  Higher scores indicate a higher tendency to ruminate.  The version of the 
RRS used in this study has five-items found to load onto a 'brooding' factor, five-items 
forming a 'reflection' factor, and 12-items considered to be confounded with depressive 
symptoms due to considerable overlap with items on the Beck Depression Inventory (Treynor 
et al., 2003).  The total scale has demonstrated good internal consistency (α=.90) and test-
retest reliability (r=.67).  The factor subscales of 'brooding' and 'reflection' have been found 
to have good construct validity with these factors being replicated in multiple studies 
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(Treynor et al., 2003).  In the current study, subscale scores of brooding and reflection were 
used in addition to the total RRS score. 
 Worry: Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990).  The PSWQ is a 16-item self-report measure that assesses trait tendency to 
engage in excessive and uncontrollable worry.  Respondents rate the extent to which the 
items are typical of themselves on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not typical at all) to 5 (Very 
typical of me), with higher scores indicating a greater tendency to worry.  The PSWQ has 
demonstrated convergent and divergent validity, internal consistency (α=.93) and test-retest 
reliability (r=.90; Meyer et al., 1990). 
 RNT: Perseverative Thought Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring, Zetsche, Weidacker, 
Wahl, Schonfeld, & Ehlers, 2011).  The PTQ is a 15-item self-report measure that assesses 
RNT transdiagnostically (i.e. is not disorder-specific) by focusing on the process of thinking 
rather than the content of thoughts.  It targets five identified characteristics of RNT: 
repetitive, involuntary, difficult to disengage from, unproductive, and that they capture 
mental capacity.  Based on the way they tend to think about negative experiences or 
problems, respondents rate how much each item applies to them on a Likert scale ranging 
from 0 (never) to 4 (almost always).  The scale has been shown to have good test-retest 
reliability (r=.76) and good concurrent validity with other measures of RNT (PSWQ, r=.57, 
and the RRS, r=.65; Ehring, 2007). 
 Mindfulness: Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire - Short Form (FFMQ-SF; 
Bohlmeijer, Klooster, Fledderus, Veehof, & Baer, 2011).  The FFMQ-SF is a 24-item self-
report measure that assesses five identified facets of mindfulness: observing, describing, 
acting with awareness, non-judging of inner experience, and non-reactivity to inner 
experience.  Each item is rated on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (never/rarely true) to 5 
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(very/often true).  The facets within the FFMQ were developed through factor analysis (Baer, 
Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer & Toney, 2006) and the FFMQ-SF has been shown to have a 
highly comparable factor structure (Bohlmeijer et al., 2011).  The FFMQ-SF has 
demonstrated good internal consistency (.75-.87; Bohlmeijer et al., 2011). 
The five subscales of the FFMQ are intended to be independent and are not typically summed 
to create a single mindfulness score.  However, for the purpose of the mediation analysis, one 
mindfulness score was required.  A sum score of the five subscales was calculated similar to 
that used by Carmody and Baer (2007) and Gard and colleagues (2012).  The FFMQ-SF as a 
unitary measure of mindfulness showed high internal consistency (see Table 4), but 
inspection of inter-item correlations showed low correlations between some items suggesting 
multiple factors within the measure.  Overall mean inter-item correlations for the FFMQ-SF 
(r=.21) were just within the recommended range of .2-.4 (Briggs & Cheek, 1986); this 
suggests a reasonable degree of relatedness between the items and therefore the total summed 
score was used for analysis. 
 Depression: Patient Health Questionnaire 9-item measure (PHQ-9; Kroenke, 
Spitzer, & Williams, 2001).  The PHQ-9 is a self-report measure that assesses severity of 
depression symptoms.  Respondents are asked to rate the frequency to which they endorse 
each item on a Likert scale from 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly every day).  Scores are summed 
with lower to higher scores interpreted as ranging from no depression, minimal, mild, 
moderate, moderately severe, or severe depression.  It has been shown to have good internal 
consistency (α=.86-.89) and test-retest reliability (r=.84; Kroenke et al., 2001). 
 Anxiety: Generalised Anxiety Disorder 7-item measure (GAD-7; Spitzer, 
Kroenke, Williams, & Löwe, 2006).  The GAD-7 is a self-report measure that assesses 
severity of anxiety symptoms.  It asks respondents to rate, using a Likert scale, how 
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frequently they experience each item from 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly every day).  Scores are 
summed and can be interpreted as minimal, mild, moderate, or severe anxiety.  It has been 
shown to have excellent internal consistency (α=.93), good test-retest reliability (r=.83), and 
to have good procedural and construct validity (Spitzer et al., 2006). 
 Well-being: WHO Well-being Index (WHO-5; World Health Organisation, 
1998).  The WHO-5 is a five-item self-report measure of well-being.  Respondents rate on a 
6-point Likert scale how frequently they have experienced each item over the last two weeks 
ranging from 0 (At no time) to 5 (All of the time).  Scores are summed and range from 0-25 
with higher scores representing a higher quality of life.  The WHO-5 has demonstrated good 
internal consistency (α=.84) in a large representative non-clinical sample (Bech, Olsen, 
Kjoller, & Rasmussen, 2003). 
 Goal discrepancy: Difference between rating of goal level achieved and goal level 
expected (see Appendix A).  Goal discrepancy was operationalised as the score difference 
between current rated level of progress achieved towards personal goals and rating of 
expected level of progress towards personal goals.  This is a similar method of measurement 
as that employed by Donovan and Willims (2003) although the current study used the format 
of goal based outcomes (GBOs; Law, 2011).  GBOs are used in clinical settings as a way of 
evaluating progress towards goals over different time points (e.g. beginning and end of 
therapy).  Respondents describe their goal and then rate on a 0-10 scale, the level of progress 
achieved towards each goal; 0 rating for no progress towards the goal, 5 for half-way towards 
achieving the goal, and 10 for the goal having been achieved.   This is then tracked over time,  
the difference between progress ratings are calculated to measure change over time.  In the 
current study, participants were asked to list five personally meaningful goals and then rate to 
what extent they had achieved progress towards each goal on a 0-10 scale as outlined 
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previously.  As the study was cross-sectional and progress could not be tracked over time, 
respondents were asked to rate on an identical scale, how much progress they had expected to 
make towards each goal by the present moment.  The difference between scores was 
calculated as an indicator of discrepancy.  Positive discrepancy scores indicate more progress 
than the respondent had expected whereas negative discrepancy scores indicate less progress 
than they expected. 
2.3.5 Procedure 
 After gaining institutional and ethical approval, an online self-report questionnaire 
survey was developed.  An online survey was selected to collect a large data sample.  This 
method of data collection has been found to be as reliable as other methods (e.g. Granello & 
Wheaton, 2004).  A pilot survey was given to 20 students and feedback was obtained 
regarding the suitability of written instructions for each measure and the ease of completion 
including the length of time it took to complete.  The majority of students were able to 
generate five personal goals and understood the distinction between rating 'actual progress' 
and 'expected progress' towards these goals; for this reason no examples of typical personal 
goals were included in the instructions so as to reduce bias.  All written instructions were 
considered clear and easy to follow.  The length of time it took to complete the questionnaire 
was reported as approximately 20-minutes. 
 An advert for the study (see Appendix B) was placed on the student intranet of the 
main University recruitment site.  The same advert, after receiving approval from the Head of 
each Psychology Department, was emailed to psychology students across another three 
Universities inviting them to participate.  The advert contained a link to a web-page with 
information about the study and a consent page (see Appendix C and D respectively).  Prior 
to completing the battery of measures, basic demographic information was collected (gender, 
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age, ethnicity, and University attended).  The measures appeared in the following order: goal 
discrepancy, the Linking Inventory, the PTQ, the RRS, the FFMQ-SF, the PSWQ, the PHQ-
9, the GAD-7, and the WHO-5.  The measures were grouped by theme, that is, goal-based 
measures were together, different types of thinking style measures were together, and mental 
health and well-being measures were together.  The questionnaire survey ended with the 
WHO-5 as it was thought to be a positive ending.  Participants were given the option of 
entering a prize draw to win vouchers to thank them for taking part.  The study was available 
online between September 2013 and March 2014. 
2.3.6 Data Analytic Procedure 
 All data were anonymous.  Data were converted and exported to the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS, version 21) and were screened and prepared prior to 
analysis.  Data were collected, stored, and exported in line with the policies of the University 
in which the study took place. 
 Preliminary correlation analyses (Pearson's product moment correlations) were 
examined between all variables to test predicted relationships as theoretically suggested by 
the literature reviewed.  To test the hypothesis that linkers engage in significantly more RNT, 
including both rumination and worry, and are less mindful than non-linkers, independent 
samples t-tests were utilised.  For the purpose of carrying out t-test analysis, participants were 
divided into linkers and non-linkers on the basis of a median split; a score of 0-9 represented 
a non-linker and a score of 10-22 represented a linker.  This is the same approach as used by 
McIntosh and colleagues (1997). 
 Mediation analysis was employed to investigate the hypothesis that goal-linking 
predicts mental health and well-being, and that this relationship is mediated by the type of 
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thinking style adopted.  Three predictions were studied: 1. goal-linking positively predicts 
depression and this is mediated by RNT; 2. goal-linking positively predicts anxiety and this is 
mediated by RNT; and 3. goal-linking negatively predicts well-being and this is mediated by 
mindfulness.  Baron and Kenny's (1986) mediational model has been superseded by Preacher 
and Hayes (2008; Hayes, 2009), who suggest that it is not necessary to find a direct effect of 
the predictor variable (goal-linking) on the outcome variables (depression, anxiety, and well-
being) in order to test for other factors that might mediate the relationship.  Hayes (2009) 
recommends the use of bootstrapped confidence intervals in order to test for indirect effects 
and this is the approach that has been used for this analysis.  This approach focuses on the 
direction and size of indirect effects rather than the significance of direct effects (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2008).  It has higher power and requires less assumptions than the causal steps 
method (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002).  Mediation analyses were 
performed using the PROCESS tool for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Response and Attrition Rates 
Participant attrition from the point of viewing the participant information sheet, to completing 
all of the measures included in the questionnaire, is detailed in Figure 2.  Feedback from 
some participants indicated that the online questionnaire webpage tended to crash on 
occasion; this could be the reason for some participants not completing the survey. 
62 
 
 
Figure 2: Flow-diagram of response and attrition rates through different stages of the online 
questionnaire. 
2.4.2 Data Preparation 
 Data were initially screened for any errors that may have occurred during exportation 
to SPSS.  The FFMQ-SF, the Linking Inventory, and the PSWQ all contained negatively 
worded items that were reverse scored prior to analysis.  Total scale scores were computed 
including calculating the variable of 'linkers' and 'non-linkers' as based on a median split.  
The reliability of scales and subscales were checked and the appropriateness of using total 
scale or subscale scores for analysis was assessed. 
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 Assessing normality.  Prior to analysis, data were examined to ensure they met the 
assumptions of linearity, homoscedasticity, and normal distribution (see Appendix E).  All 
variables appeared to meet the assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity.  Normality 
assumptions were violated on depression and anxiety variables, and so transformations were 
conducted to correct for issues of skewness and kurtosis.  Data analysis were run with both 
transformed and non-transformed data and no differences were observed in findings (i.e. 
significant findings remained), and therefore transformed variables were used. 
2.4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The means and standard deviations of all measures were found to be comparable to those 
reported by other studies in non-clinical samples (see Table 4). 
2.4.4 Demographic Variables 
 Confounding effects of age, gender, and ethnicity, on the main study variables, were 
examined using correlation coefficients.  Age was significantly correlated with most variables 
to a weak or moderate degree.  It was negatively related to goal-linking, RNT, rumination 
(but not the reflection factor), worry, depression, and anxiety (r = -.17 to -.31, p < .05) with 
younger people scoring higher on these variables, and positively associated with mindfulness, 
including the facets of describing, non-judgement, and non-reactivity, but not the observing 
and acting with awareness facet, and with well-being (r = .23 to .28, p < .001).  Younger 
people were lower on the mindfulness aspects of describing, being non-judgemental and non-
reactive to inner experiences.  Age was not significantly correlated with goal discrepancy.  
Gender was significantly correlated with worry (r = .35, p < .001), anxiety (r = .16, p < .05), 
and goal discrepancy (r = .16, p < .05), but not with any other variables.  Females showed 
higher levels of worry, anxiety, and goal discrepancy than males.  Ethnicity was only 
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significantly correlated with the describing facet of the FFMQ-SF (r = -.18, p < .05).  Age, 
gender, and ethnicity were not significantly correlated with each other. 
Table 4 
Cronbach Alpha, score range, mean (M), standard deviation (SD), and comparative M and SD for all 
scales and subscales 
Scales & 
Subscales 
Cronbach 
Alpha (α) Range M SD 
Comparati
ve M 
Comparati
ve SD 
Goal-linking 0.79 0-22 9.66 4.44 6.52 NR 
PTQ 0.93 0-60 27.77 11.99 28.14 13.23
1 
RRS 0.92 22-88 43.87 11.41 40.8 10.8
2 
Brooding† 0.78 05-20 10.05 3.15 9.4 2.962 
Reflection† 0.75 05-20 9.37 2.99 9.83 3.112 
PSWQ 0.95 16-80 49.92 14.57 48.8 13.8
3 
FFMQ-SF 0.87 24-120 77.25 13.22 - - 
Observing† 0.77 04-20 13.32 3.61 13.86 3.214 
Describing† 0.85 05-25 17.23 4.55 16.28 3.914 
Act aware† 0.81 05-25 15.89 3.91 13.19 3.324 
Non-judge† 0.78 05-25 16.08 4.23 14.09 3.634 
Non-react† 0.75 05-25 14.73 3.7 13.47 3.074 
PHQ-9* 0.86 0-27 7.10 (2.42) 5.45 (1.11) 5.54 1.82
5 
GAD-7* 0.91 0-21 5.20 (1.98) 4.80 (1.14) 2.95 3.41
6 
WHO-5 0.88 0-25 13.7 5.11 68.7 19.0
7 
Goal disc. - -10-10 1.22 1.49 - - 
Note. NR = Not reported, Goal disc. = Goal discrepancy.  
1 
(McIntosh, Martin, & Jones, 1997);
 2 
(Treynor et al., 2003);
 3 
(Meyer et al., 1990);
 4 
(Bohlmeijer et al., 2011);
 5 
(Kroenke et al., 2001);
 6 
(Löwe et al., 2008), 
7
(Bech et al., 2003).
 
*Denotes transformed variables: the bracketed number is the figure reflecting the transformed 
variable.  Note that transformed variables were used in all analyses described below.  † Denotes 
subscale. 
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2.4.5 Examination of Relationships Between Variables 
 The first aim was to investigate the relationships between goal-linking, RNT 
(including RNT as a unitary construct, and rumination and worry separately), mindfulness, 
depression, anxiety, and well-being.  Pearson's product moment correlations were calculated 
for all pairs of variables (see Table 5).  All variables were correlated in predicted ways, 
although all were predominantly moderate correlations.  Goal-linking was significantly 
positively correlated with RNT, rumination (but not the reflection component), worry, 
depression, and anxiety, and negatively correlated with mindfulness (including all five 
facets), and well-being.  The reflection component of the RRS showed a similar pattern of 
relationships as the brooding component of the RRS but with much weaker correlations.  The 
observing facet of the FFMQ-SF showed small positive correlations with the other facets of 
the FFMQ-SF.  The observing facet was not significantly related with rumination, depression, 
or well-being, and was only weakly negatively correlated with worry and anxiety. 
 Goal discrepancy was not significantly related to RNT but was significantly positively 
related to rumination (not the reflection component) and worry.  Goal discrepancy was also 
positively associated with depression and anxiety, and negatively with mindfulness and well-
being.  The strongest relationship observed with goal discrepancy was with the acting with 
awareness facet of the FFMQ-SF, with a higher goal discrepancy associated with lower levels 
of acting with awareness. 
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Table 5 
Pearson's product moment correlations between study variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1.Goal-linking  .37** .34** .41** .01 .45** -.41** -.20** -.25** -.21** -.34** -.35** .45** .41** -.45** .17* 
2. RNT   .51** .53** .22** .56** -.55** -.19* -.31** -.42** -.53** -.36** .55** .55* -.45** .10 
3. Rumination    .82** .75** .50** -.52** -.06 -.30** -.40** -.56** -.37** .58** .59** -.54** .19* 
4. Brooding†     .49** .53** -.53** -.10 -.33** -.34** -.57** -.37** .50** .55** -.45** .20** 
5. Reflection†      .17* -.22** .02 -.12 -.12 -.35** -.11 .28** .30** -.20* -.01 
6. Worry       -.55** -.15* -.30** -.35** -.45** -.55** .46** .60** -.49** .21** 
7.Mindfulness        .53** .72** .67** .74** .63** -.49** -.50** .54** -.31** 
8.Observing†         .21** .16* .20** .25** -.15 -.19* .11 -.17* 
9.Describing†          .39** .38** .28** -.29** -.30** .33** -.15* 
10.Act aware†           .43** .23** -.37** -.34** .44** -.33** 
11.Non-judge†            .36** -.43** -.45** .42** -.19* 
12.Non-react†             -.37** -.37** .45** -.17* 
13.Depression              .78** -.72** .21** 
14. Anxiety               -.58** .25** 
15. Well-being                -.20* 
16.Goal disc.                 
Note. Goal disc. = Goal discrepancy. 
* Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level. ** Correlation is significant at the p<.01 level.  † Denotes subscale. 
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2.4.6 Examination of Differences Between Linkers and Non-linkers 
 Independent samples t-tests were employed to test the prediction that linkers would 
engage in more RNT, including rumination and worry, and would be less mindful, than non-
linkers (see Table 6).  Linkers reported significantly higher levels of RNT, including 
rumination (but not the reflection factor) and worry, than non-linkers.  Linkers also reported 
being significantly less mindful overall and on the facets of observing, non-judging, and non-
reactivity, but not on the facets of describing and acting with awareness of the FFMQ-SF. 
Table 6 
Difference between linkers and non-linkers on RNT, rumination, worry, and mindfulness; 
mean (M), standard deviation (SD), and t-value 
Variable Linkers M (SD) 
n = 103 
Non-linkers M (SD) 
n = 73 
Significant difference 
t-value 
RNT 30.62 (11.81) 23.44 (11.04) t(174) = 4.09** 
Rumination 45.74 (11.26) 41.12 (11.03) t(173) = 2.70* 
Brooding† 10.80 (3.15) 8.97 (2.80) t(173) = 3.97** 
Reflection† 9.28 (2.77) 9.52 (3.25) t(173) = 0.52 
Worry 53.58 (13.50) 44.97 (14.52) t(165) = 3.93** 
Mindfulness 73.51 (11.39) 82.23 (13.96) t(167) = 4.46** 
Observing† 12.80 (3.65) 13.93 (3.53) t(167) = 2.01* 
Describing† 16.67 (4.37) 18.01 (4.66) t(167) = 1.92 
Acting aware† 15.39 (3.85) 16.51 (3.90) t(167) = 1.85 
Non-judge† 14.91 (3.62) 17.70 (4.47) t(167) = 4.48** 
Non-react† 13.74 (3.20) 16.07 (3.91) t(167) = 4.25** 
* Difference is significant at the p<.05 level. ** Correlation is significant at the p<.01 level.              
† Denotes subscale. 
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2.4.7 Mediation Analysis 
 Mediation analyses were performed to test whether RNT mediated the relationships 
between goal-linking and depression, and goal-linking and anxiety, and whether mindfulness 
mediated the relationship between goal-linking and well-being. 
 RNT mediating the relationship between goal-linking and depression.  Simple 
linear regressions showed that goal-linking was positively associated with depression (β = 
.11, t(2,162) = 4.06, p < .001; see Figure 3).  Results also indicated that goal-linking was 
positively associated with RNT (β = 1.05, t(1,163) = 5.49, p < .001) and that RNT was 
positively associated with depression (β = .04, t(2,162) = 6.52, p < .001).  As predicted, RNT 
mediated the relationship between goal-linking and depression (β = .04, 95%CI = .03 to .07).  
In addition, the direct effect of goal-linking on depression decreased (β = .07, t(1,163) = 6.45, 
p < .001) when RNT was included in the mediation model but did not reduce to zero 
indicating partial mediation.  A partial mediator explains some of the variance in the 
regression equation but suggests that there are other mediators contributing to the indirect 
effects (Preacher & Kelley, 2011). 
 
Figure 3: Un-standardised regression coefficients for the relationship between goal-linking 
and depression as mediated by RNT.  The un-standardised regression coefficient between 
goal-linking and depression, controlling for RNT, is in parenthesis. 
**p<.001. 
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 RNT mediating the relationship between goal-linking and anxiety.  Simple linear 
regressions found that goal-linking was positively associated with anxiety (β = .10, t(2,162) = 
3.24, p < .001; see Figure 4).  Results also indicated that goal-linking was positively 
associated with RNT (β = 1.05, t(1,163) = 5.49, p < .001) and RNT was positively associated 
with anxiety (β = .04, t(2,162) = 6.65, p < .001).  As predicted, RNT mediated the 
relationship between goal-linking and anxiety (β = .05, 95%CI = .03 to .07) and the direct 
effect of goal-linking on anxiety decreased when RNT was included in the mediation model 
(β = .06, t(1,163) = 5.68, p < .001), indicating RNT is a partial mediator. 
 
Figure 4: Un-standardised regression coefficients for the relationship between goal-linking 
and anxiety as mediated by RNT.  The un-standardised regression coefficient between goal-
linking and anxiety, controlling for RNT, is in parenthesis. 
**p<.001. 
 Mindfulness mediating the relationship between goal-linking and well-being.  
Simple linear regression indicated goal-linking was negatively associated with well-being (β 
= -.51, t(2,160) = -3.70, p < .001; see Figure 5).  Results also showed that goal-linking was 
negatively associated with mindfulness (β = -1.27, t(1,161) = -6.04, p < .001) and 
mindfulness was positively associated with well-being (β = .17, t(2,160) = 5.98, p < .001).  
As predicted, mindfulness mediated the relationship between goal-linking and well-being (β 
= -.21, 95%CI = -.33 to -.12).  In addition, the direct effect of goal-linking on well-being 
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decreased when mindfulness was included in the mediation model (β = -.30, t(1,161) = 6.30, 
p < .001) indicating partial mediation. 
 
Figure 5: Un-standardised regression coefficients for the relationship between goal-linking 
and well-being as mediated by mindfulness.  The un-standardised regression coefficient 
between goal-linking and well-being, controlling for mindfulness, is in parenthesis. 
**p<.001. 
2.5 Discussion 
 All constructs demonstrated predominantly moderate significant relationships with 
each other as predicted.  Linkers engaged in significantly more RNT, including rumination 
(but not the reflection factor) and worry, than non-linkers.  Linkers were significantly less 
mindful overall including the facets of observing, non-judging, and non-reactivity, but not the 
facets of describing and acting with awareness of the FFMQ-SF.  RNT mediated the 
relationship between goal-linking and depressive symptoms, it mediated the relationship 
between goal-linking and anxious symptoms, and mindfulness mediated the relationship 
between goal-linking and well-being.  Higher levels of goal-linking predicted depressive and 
anxious symptoms and this was partially explained by RNT.  Lower levels of goal-linking 
predicted higher well-being and this was partially explained by mindfulness. 
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2.5.1 Relationships Between Goal-linking, RNT, mindfulness, and Depressive/Anxious 
Symptoms 
 Links between rumination and depression, and worry and anxiety, were observed with 
similar converse patterns (i.e. rumination and anxiety, and worry and depression), providing 
further support that rumination and worry are transdiagnostic processes.  The relationships 
between these variables remained comparable when rumination and worry were measured 
collectively using a measure of RNT.  This is in line with the growing recognition that both 
rumination and worry can be conceptualised and measured within one overarching meta-
process of RNT.  One exception is the reflection factor of the RRS, which showed weaker 
and more varied associations.  These findings are in line with previous research suggesting 
the reflection factor of the RRS as a distinct construct from other aspects of rumination 
(Treynor et al., 2003).  A relatively small association was observed between reflection and 
the PTQ, a unitary measure of RNT, suggesting the reflection construct is perhaps somewhat 
distinct from RNT and/or is not fully represented in the PTQ.  Reflection was not 
significantly related to goal-linking, although, other measures of rumination (including 
brooding) and RNT were. 
The findings that higher levels of goal-linking are related to engaging in more RNT, 
including rumination (but not reflection), and to experiencing increased symptoms of 
depression is in line with previous research (McIntosh et al., 1995).  Lower levels of goal-
linking appear to relate to being more mindful, particularly remaining non-judgemental and 
non-reactive to internal experiences, and to greater levels of well-being.  The relations 
between goal-linking and rumination, and goal-linking and depression, had previously been 
observed (McIntosh et al., 1995) but those between goal-linking and worry, and goal-linking 
and anxiety were preliminary investigations that extend previous research. 
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2.5.2 Impact of Goal-linking and RNT on Mental Health and Well-being 
 Linkers were found to engage in significantly more RNT than non-linkers.  This 
included RNT measured as a unitary construct, rumination (including the brooding but not 
reflection factor), and worry.  This adds to previous findings that linkers engage in more 
rumination than non-linkers (McIntosh et al., 1995) and indicates a similar tendency for 
worry.  McIntosh and colleagues (1995) did not distinguish between brooding and reflection 
when they measured rumination.  This would seem an important distinction given the current 
findings indicate linkers and non-linkers differ in terms of brooding, but not reflection.  As 
with rumination, linkers appear to engage in significantly more worry and RNT, measured as 
a unitary construct.  This supports the hypothesis that rumination and worry operate in a 
similar manner in relation to how people regard their goals, that is, whether they link the 
attainment of lower-order goals to higher-order personal strivings in a dependant way.  It is 
also in line with the proposal that linkers may engage in more RNT because they are more 
susceptible to perceiving goal discrepancy (McIntosh et al., 1995). 
Higher goal-linking significantly predicted higher levels of depressive and anxious 
symptoms, and this relationship was mediated by RNT.  RNT partially explained the effect of 
goal-linking on depressive and anxious symptoms suggesting that in addition to other factors, 
engaging in RNT accounts for some of the relationship between higher goal-linking and 
higher depressive and anxious symptoms.  Linkers tend to hold higher expectations towards 
achieving their goals, and these often involve more abstract reference values (McIntosh, 
Martin, & Jones, 1997).  Higher expectations are associated with increased goal commitment 
(Oettingen, Honig, & Gollwitzer, 2000) and may leave linkers committed to striving towards 
goals but the reference value may be relatively vague.  They may exert high degrees of effort 
but struggle to recognise whether they have achieved their goal or not.  In line with Watkins' 
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(2008) proposal, linkers may experience more negative thought from constantly perceiving a 
discrepancy between their current and target status, this discrepancy is likely to produce 
negative affect, and, they may focus on more abstract goals.  Taken together, these conditions 
would be more likely to result in unconstructive consequences of RNT (Watkins, 2008), such 
as poorer outcomes for mental health.  McIntosh (1996) advocates categorising people as 
linkers and non-linkers but suggests that this is not an individual difference per se, more 
accurately it is a belief system regarding the implications of goal attainment.  Therapeutic 
approaches to unhelpful beliefs, such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, advise that 
maladaptive beliefs can be modified through challenging them (Beck, 2011).  This implies 
that beliefs about goal attainment being crucial for achieving one's personal strivings, that is, 
the key distinguishing factor between linkers and non-linkers, is potentially open to 
adaptation and change. 
 Linkers appeared less mindful, especially on the facets of observing the present 
moment and not judging or reacting to their internal experiences.  One interpretation is that 
linkers relate all goals to their higher-order personal strivings and, therefore, are responsive to 
any sense of threat towards these goals.  Linkers may regard being observant, judgemental 
and reactive to their experience, as important ways of improving the potential for goal 
achievement.  Mindfulness mediated the relationship between goal-linking and well-being 
suggesting that for non-linkers, mindfulness may be a protective factor that is associated with 
increased well-being, but for linkers, they may struggle to let go of reacting to their 
experience and this could have a detrimental impact on their well-being.  In conjunction, 
these findings support the proposal that decentering could be a potential mechanism by which 
mindfulness helps people disengage from RNT (Raes & Williams, 2009).  As linkers were 
less able not to judge or react to their thoughts and emotions, this increased the negative 
effect of goal-linking on well-being.  This implies that if linkers could improve their ability to 
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non-judgementally accept their internal experiences, this could have a beneficial and 
protective impact on their well-being. 
2.5.3 Confounds of Age and Gender 
While the majority of this sample were within a limited age range (87.6% aged between 18-
30 years), age was significantly correlated with a number of the study variables suggesting it 
may be a confounding factor.  It has been suggested that engaging in rumination may vary 
across the lifespan, with the tendency reducing as people get older (Sutterlin, Paap, Babic, 
Kubler, & Vogele, 2012).  Levels of anxiety and depression have also been shown to 
decrease with age, with reduced emotional responsiveness, increased emotional control, and 
psychological immunisation suggested as possible reasons for why this may be (Jorm, 2000).  
The association between goal-linking and age has not previously been reported.  It requires 
replication in a more representative sample and further investigation to clarify the nature of 
the relationship. 
 There were more females than males in this study (76.9% female) and research has 
consistently shown that females have a higher prevalence of anxiety symptoms (McLean & 
Anderson, 2009) and engage in more worry than males (Robichaud, Dugas, & Conway, 
2003).  Gender role orientation theory (Block, 1983) has been used to interpret both of these 
findings.  It is proposed that women are encouraged to be more expressive and seek social 
support in response to fears whereas men to be more instrumental in managing by themselves 
(Zalta & Chambless, 2012).  Thought suppression and negative problem orientation (i.e. 
seeing a problem as a threat and perceiving it as being outside of one's control) are higher 
among women and have been found to mediate the relationship between gender and worry 
(Robichaud, Dugas, & Conway, 2003).  These theories could similarly apply to the difference 
between males and females in the amount of discrepancy between current level of goal 
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progress and the expected level of progress (i.e. women may perceive themselves as being 
less able to control progress towards their goals).  However, the impact of gender on goal 
discrepancy would require further investigation to draw such conclusions. 
2.6 Clinical Implications 
 When linkers engage in RNT, which they appear more likely to do so, it has a 
detrimental effect on their mental health; they were more likely to experience anxious and 
depressive symptoms.  Reducing RNT could potentially reduce the negative consequences 
associated with being a linker.  Mindfulness-based interventions have been found to reduce 
the degree to which people engage in RNT such as rumination (Deyo, Wilson, Ong, & 
Koopman, 2009; Raes et al., 2009).  Advocating mindfulness to help linkers disengage from 
unhelpful RNT is further supported by the current findings that mindfulness was negatively 
associated with RNT, anxiety, and depression, positively associated with well-being, and 
mediated the relationship between goal-linking and well-being.  Striving towards more 
abstract higher-order goals has been shown to lead to increased psychological distress 
(Emmons, 1992).  In light of this, it may be more adaptive for linkers to set more concrete 
and realistic goals so that they can easily assess their progress and ultimately get the sense of 
having achieved their goal.  The GBO approach advocates the use of SMART goals (i.e. 
specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and timely) to increase goal focus but warrants 
caution that this is not always necessary or desirable in all aspects of clinical work (Law, 
2011).  For linkers this approach may be beneficial, especially if they are currently 
experiencing problems, as concrete thinking is more adaptive in problematic situations 
(Watkins, 2008).  This could also potentially reduce the extent of RNT linkers engage in as 
having a more concrete goal would arguably make it easier to measure progress and achieve 
the goal, hence reducing the degree of discrepancy experienced. 
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 The current findings were within a non-clinical sample and therefore any implications 
drawn from this study would need to be tentative in relating them to clinical settings.  Similar 
findings would need to be replicated in a clinical sample in order to draw more valid 
conclusions about mental health interventions with clinical populations.  However, the 
implications of these findings are applicable within a student sample.  There may be potential 
benefits for linkers in promoting mindfulness training to reduce engagement in RNT, and 
advocating setting more concrete and attainable goals.  These could be offered through 
community interventions like educational posters, group mindfulness sessions, and offering 
counselling and advice in relation to goal setting.  Promoting these interventions among 
students who are high on the tendency to goal-link could potentially reduce the risk of 
developing depressive and/or anxious symptoms, and would likely encourage better mental 
well-being. 
2.7 Limitations and Future Research 
 The current study has a number of limitations.  First, a convenience sample of 
University students was used as they were a readily accessible sample.  While University 
samples are not wholly representative of the general population (Henreich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010), they are commonly used within social science research and reflected a 
reasonably heterogeneous sample.  However, this limits the ecological validity of these 
findings in the general population.  The majority of the sample were female, within a limited 
age range (18-30 years), classified their ethnicity as White, and all participants were educated 
to at least A-level standard or equivalent, as they were recruited through the University they 
were attending.  Certain constructs measured in this study have been found to vary according 
to population, and in this sample, age and gender may have confounded the findings, limiting 
generalisability.  Although means and standard deviations were comparable to previous 
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studies in non-clinical samples, any suggestion that similar relationships between study 
variables are universally common is hasty.  These findings would need to be replicated in a 
broader more representative sample perhaps using stratified sampling.  Alternatively, a 
similar study could be carried out with clinical populations to examine the applicability of 
these findings for those experiencing clinical levels of anxiety and depression. 
 The study relied on self-report measures and did not account for response bias.  Self-
report methodology is common among social science studies but can only be considered valid 
to the extent that participants can accurately assess each domain to which they are 
responding.  While the self-report measures employed in the current study were considered to 
be the most appropriate to answer the research questions, they had some limitations.  There 
remains some dispute over how rumination is conceptualised and measured (Smith & Alloy, 
2009) and whether RNT can be measured as a unitary construct.  Recommended subscales of 
the RRS were adopted for the current study and while brooding was consistent with the PTQ, 
reflection demonstrated much weaker associations.  While measures of RNT included a 
unitary measure (the PTQ), and separate measures of rumination (the RRS including 
subscales of brooding and reflection), and worry (PSWQ), only the PTQ score was used for 
the mediation analysis.  The PTQ may not accurately account for the reflection factor of 
rumination and therefore the use of a more comprehensive measure may be warranted.  The 
observing facet of the FFMQ-SF has been highlighted as showing somewhat unpredictable 
relationships with other relevant variables (Baer, 2011; Baer et al., 2006) which has led to 
suggestions of excluding this facet from future measures of mindfulness (Baer, 2011).  The 
Linking Inventory has had limited use in published studies and its validity and reliability 
merit further examination. 
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 The mediation analyses demonstrated partial mediation suggesting that there are other 
factors contributing to the relationships between goal-linking and depressive and anxious 
symptoms and goal-linking and mindfulness, other than RNT.  Further research is necessary 
to explore what these other factors may be and the role that they play in contributing to 
mental health and well-being. 
2.8 Conclusions 
 Linkers engage in significantly more RNT than non-linkers and RNT mediates the 
relationship between goal-linking and depressive and anxious symptoms.  Linkers are also 
significantly less mindful and mindfulness mediates the relationship between goal-linking 
and well-being.  Goal-linking likely increases people's perception of discrepancy between 
current and target status, which increases the use of RNT as a self-regulation strategy.  
Linking everyday goals to personal strivings that are deemed as highly important and have 
more abstract reference values, produces unhelpful outcomes of RNT, such as increased 
anxious and depressive symptoms.  Mindfulness training may reduce linkers engagement in 
RNT and have better outcomes for their well-being. 
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Appendix A 
Goal Discrepancy Measure 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please list 5 personal goals that you are aiming to achieve.  There are no right or 
wrong answers, a personal goal is any goal, big or small, which is meaningful to you. 
For each goal, please rate between 0-10 how much progress you have currently made towards 
achieving the goal (Rating A).  Please also rate how much progress you had expected to make towards 
this goal at this time (Rating B). 
EXAMPLE: I am currently half-way towards achieving my goal (Rating A = 5).  I would have 
expected to have nearly achieved this goal by now (Rating B = 9). 
Goal 1 
Please list your goal 
 
 
Rating A 
How much progress have you currently made towards achieving this goal? 
Use the slider to rate between 0='No progress' and 10='Goal achieved' 
 
 
Rating B 
How much progress had you expected to make towards this goal by now? 
Use the slider to rate between 0='No progress' and 10='Goal achieved' 
 
 
(Same format repeated for Goal 2, Goal 3, Goal 4, & Goal 5) 
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Appendix E 
Data Preparation 
 Linearity and homoscedasticity were assessed using residual plots and bivariate 
scatterplots between pairs of variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) and all variables 
appeared to meet these assumptions.  As recommended by Field (2009), graphical methods of 
assessing normality, such as inspecting histograms, as well as statistical methods, such as 
examining the values of skewness and kurtosis (i.e. the shape of the distributions), were 
followed.  There is a general rule of thumb that skewness and kurtosis values between -1 and 
+1 are acceptable for the assumption of normal distribution (Lei & Lomax, 2005).  A review 
of the skewness and kurtosis values indicated that most were within acceptable limits with the 
exception of depression and anxiety scales which were above 1.  Depression and anxiety 
were positively skewed (1.09 and 1.36 respectively) and leptokurtic (1.06 and 1.75 
respectively).  This is common when measuring anxiety and depression symptoms in a non-
clinical sample as these would not be expected to be high (Field, 2009).  Therefore, as per 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), square root transformations were applied to depression and 
anxiety scale scores.  Post transformation skewness and kurtosis values indicated that these 
were acceptable for both depression (-0.18 and 0.05, respectively) and anxiety (-0.03 and -
0.29, respectively).  All analyses conducted with transformed variables, were also carried out 
with non-transformed variables, and no substantial difference between results was observed 
(i.e. no difference in significant and non-significant findings and correlation coefficients, t 
values, and beta values were comparable).  Therefore, transformations did not change the 
results and transformed variables were therefore used in all further analysis.   
 
